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INTRODUCTION
1

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a vast and sprawling marketplace that sprang up just as the peace accords were going into effect,
bringing to some conclusion three-and-a-half years of bloody ethnic
fighting. The place is called Arizona Market, and it was created, fos2
tered, and supported by the international community (IC) —hyped as
a shining example of capitalism and evidence of the positive impact of
the particular type of political and economic engineering that takes
place with internationally assisted postwar reconstruction. But even
while Arizona Market was supported by the IC, it was also a place
where men from the region would bring women to be bought and
sold like chattel alongside drugs, weapons, bootleg media, and knockoff athletic gear.
The proliferation of narratives about what Arizona Market truly
represents belies the market’s short and unglamorous existence—the
market is a mere thirty-five acres in size, only fourteen years old, and
host to thousands of flea-market stalls. Many of the internationals
present during the early days after the Dayton Peace Accords—mostly
military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actors—pointed to Arizona
3
Market as the one place in Bosnia where Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks
1

The name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, abbreviated BiH, but this
Article will use the shorthand “Bosnia” to refer to the entire country.
2
The term “IC” is often used to describe internationals working for military, diplomatic, humanitarian, or other international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
working on and funding postconflict reconstruction programs.
3
The term “Bosniak,” also spelled “Bosniac,” is used to refer to a Bosnian citizen
who is neither ethnically Serb nor Croat and who may be, but is not always, Muslim.
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peaceably interacted. As they protected the market and funded its
expansion, these internationals spun stories about their hopes for its
ability to bring about peaceful relations between warring ethnicities
through the neutrality of commerce, notwithstanding the fact that
peace was hard to come by in the rest of Bosnia. The international actors then extrapolated from this perceived success, stating that the
success of Arizona Market in achieving interethnic harmony was an
example of how the free market could overcome ethnic disharmony
in greater Bosnia and perhaps anywhere in the world. For quite some
time, the IC ignored the fact that women were being sold in the marketplace, like slaves at auction, to be sent to brothels all over the region and beyond. The IC turned a blind eye to the trafficking, even
though (or perhaps because) some of its members were themselves
purchasing and selling women for sex and other indentured services.
When stories began emerging outside of Bosnia about human trafficking emanating from the hub of Arizona Market, the narrative abruptly
changed. Suddenly, Arizona Market was described as a dark and seedy place, full of corruption and hidden, nefarious criminal activity.
The narratives surrounding Arizona Market are conflicting, but
perhaps they all hold some truth. Arizona Market was in fact a place
to buy the goods necessary for daily survival when there were none to
be found elsewhere in decimated postwar Bosnia, but it was also a
place to buy human beings to satisfy the sexual demands of the internationals. It remains a dark place, laden with black market activity
and organized crime, even after the eventual taxation of goods passing through Arizona Market funded the democratic success story of
Brcko, the town in whose shadow Arizona Market sits.
This Article employs the example of Arizona Market to illustrate
some of the harms that emanate from the politico-economic engineering that takes place in early phases of postconflict reconstruction, in
particular the harms that befall women. Part I examines the creation
of Arizona Market, exploring the intentions of the various actors involved. Part II analyzes the activities that took place in Arizona Market
and how the market’s evolution was affected by local, regional, national, and international politics. Part III examines the negative impacts of those activities on women, the emergence of human trafficking, and the general disregard for women in the peacemaking, peacebuilding, and reconstruction processes in Bosnia. It also looks more
deeply at the effects of neoliberal policies and projects on women.
Part IV concludes with some observations about the problems inherent in postconflict reconstruction and internationally assisted eco-
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nomic transition. It also questions the soundness of practices that assume capitalism and free market ideology as necessary or inherent
components of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law,
especially when one result is the disempowerment of women and the
creation of a market for trafficking in human beings.
I. ARIZONA MARKET IN CONTEXT
As the war ended and the IC descended upon Bosnia, the country
was not only transitioning from war to peace; it was also transitioning
from communism to democracy and from a socialist to a privatized,
4
capitalist (some would say neoliberalized) economy. Admittedly, this
combination of circumstances is somewhat rare in the postconflict reconstruction context. Nonetheless, this Article illustrates the risks of
assuming that democratization and market liberalization are de facto
the best postconflict transitional options, regardless of what the preconflict political and economic systems were.
A. Postwar Bosnia
The war in Bosnia formally concluded in December 1995 with the
signing in Dayton, Ohio, of the General Framework Agreement for
5
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Framework is a document reflecting the modern interventionist prescription for peacemaking and
postconflict reconstruction. It set forth not just the conditions for securing peace but also specified the programs deemed essential to sus4

Prewar Bosnia had a socialist economy in which most firms were owned and controlled by the workers and not the state. But the IC, via the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had already begun imposing economic liberalization
requirements on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after the death of Tito in
1980. Similarly, Bosnia had already begun taking steps toward holding free and democratic elections before the start of the war. Cf. CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 116-17 (2000) (discussing how international intervention in conflicts leads to sustained international involvement and imposition of international
views of governance). See generally Dina Francesca Haynes, The Deus ex Machina Descends: The Laws, Priorities and Players Central to the International Administration of PostConflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (outlining the pervasive changes imposed by international forces following the war), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION 3, 4-6
(Dina Francesca Haynes ed., 2008); Stef Jansen, “Home” and Return in the Foreign Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Anthropological Critique (arguing that neoliberal
and capitalist structures imposed upon Bosnia were both destabilizing to the preexisting culture and “woefully incomplete”), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION,
supra, at 29, 41-44.
5
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. &
Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Framework].
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6

taining peace. It went far beyond a mere cease-fire agreement, creating roles for the short- and long-term involvement of the IC in the
litical, legal, and economic institution building of the country after
the conflict.
The four-year war in Bosnia decimated its fledgling economy, which
had begun making the economic transition from socialism to capitalism
7
after the death of Tito, before the war began. In 1990, two years before
the siege of Sarajevo began, Bosnia had a GDP of $11 billion and per
8
capita income of $2400. By 1995, at the time of the cease-fire, GDP
9
had fallen to $2 billion and per capita income was estimated at $500.
By the end of the war, between seventy and eighty percent of the popu10
lation was unemployed. Those who did work were employed by governmental entities (e.g., police, schools, and municipal governments)—jobs awarded according to political party affiliation and
11
ethnicity. Of the unemployed at the conclusion of the war, some were
fortunate enough to find employment with international organizations
over the following few years. But reliance on the IC for employment
created an extremely polarized economy and labor market in which
most people worked either for the local government or the interna12
tional administrative government. It also created an economy falsely
supported and driven by the international presence.
6

See generally Haynes, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that the IC wanted to ensure
through the Dayton Accords that all refugees and displaced persons could return home).
7
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8
See Int’l Progress Org., Rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina: Achievements and Difficulties, http://i-p-o.org/rebuilding-bosnia.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
9
See id.; cf. THE WORLD BANK, BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA—COUNTRY BRIEF 2009
(2009), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/
BOSNIAHERZEXTN/0,,menuPK:362036~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:
362026,00.html.
10
See Int’l Progress Org., supra note 8; see also VESNA BOJICIC-DŽELILOVIC ET AL.,
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—UNDERSTANDING REFORM 3 (2004), available at http://
www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/GDN_UnderstandingReform_BosniaHerzegovina.pdf.
11
See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2000),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/321.htm (“[M]any viewed
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way . . . to obtain, regain, or keep . . . jobs in the state-owned sector of the economy.”).
12
In an odd gender twist, the majority of locals hired by international organizations were women. This was not only because women were perceived to have better
administrative or “secretarial” skills but also because more women had studied the social sciences and the English language, skills that were particularly sought after by international organizations, the United Nations (U.N.), and the military. This disparity
in the types of jobs held by men (international men held the large majority of highlevel positions within international organizations) and women (the majority of whom
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The black market had thrived during the war, with black marketeers
selling illegal arms, cigarettes, food staples, and identity documents, and
engaging in all types of smuggling. It was not dismantled after the Dayton Framework was signed. Rather, the black marketeers and smugglers
employed the same skills and smuggling routes they had devised during
13
the war and simply began dealing in different goods—from flour, track
14
suits, and cigarettes to drugs, weapons, and human beings.
B. The First Myth of the Free Market: Achieving Ethnic
Harmony Through Market Forces
[The Arizona Market] became the model for the rest of Bosnia for stimulating
economic activity and establishing a potential for economic reintegration.
Colonel Greg Fontenot, U.S. Army (Ret.)

15

At the Arizona Market, stall owners and patrons come from all of Bosnia’s ethnic groups, and even across borders from neighboring Croatia
and Serbia to sell goods and find deals. . . . On a daily basis, Bosniaks,
Serbs, and Croats interact, socialize, exchange information and sometimes discover how similar they really are.
U.S. Agency for International Development

16

were local administrative staff) created inflated potential for sexual harassment and an
extreme power differential. For more on the gender disparity in hiring among international organizations and attendant sexual harassment problems, see Dina Francesca
Haynes, Ethics of International Civil Service: A Reflection on How the Care of United Nations’
Staff Impacts the Ability to Fulfill Their Role in “Harmonizing” the World, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL’Y 175, 209-12 (2008), and Madeleine Rees, International Intervention in BosniaHerzegovina: The Cost of Ignoring Gender, in THE POSTWAR MOMENT: MILITARIES, MASCULINITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: BOSNIA AND THE NETHERLANDS 51, 5758 (Cynthia Cockburn & Dubravka Zarkov eds., 2002). In fact, I recall more than one
meeting at which I and Rees were the only international women in senior positions at a
table full of men, with local Bosnian women sitting in chairs around the edges of the
walls, serving as administrative assistants.
13
These routes had arguably existed for hundreds of years. See Aida A. Hozic, The
Balkan Merchants: Changing Borders and Informal Transnationalization, 5 ETHNOPOLITICS
243, 245-49 (2006) (documenting the origin of the trade routes during the Ottoman
Empire and their resurgence at various points over the centuries).
14
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Subcomm. on Democratic Governance, Organized
Crime—Drug and Human Trafficking in Europe, paras. 11-13, 15-16, 141 CCDG 03 E. rev. 1
(Nov. 9, 2003) (prepared by Christine Boutin), available at http://www.natopa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=368 (recording trafficking of narcotics, including heroin, ecstasy, and cannabis, and human trafficking on a large scale throughout Europe).
15
Greg Fontenot, The Urban Area During Stability Missions Case Study: BosniaHerzegovina (pt. 1), in CAPITAL PRESERVATION: PREPARING FOR URBAN OPERATIONS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY app. F at 211-12 (Russell W. Glenn ed., 2001).
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The ethnic hatred all share is put aside in the interests of need and economic gain, both powerful counteractive agents when it comes to prejudice.
Charles G. Boyd, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)

17

In this atmosphere—with black market activity rampant—Arizona
Market sprang to life, fueled by a need for the goods necessary for daily
survival and by the economic, political, and legal vacuum that existed in
the days and months after the cease-fire. At first, the market consisted
of a handful of ramshackle stalls situated along a road known by the international military as Arizona Route. Named by the American unit of
the international Stabilization Forces (SFOR) who primarily used and
18
patrolled it, Arizona Route linked the towns of Doboj in the Serb enti19
ty (the Republika Srpska) and Tuzla in the Bosnian-Croat entity (the
20
Federation), where the U.S. forces were headquartered.
While the IC may or may not have actually created Arizona Mar21
ket, it certainly emboldened the marketeers who were setting up
shop there. The IC initially ignored the marketeers’ presence despite
regularly patrolling the area and later encouraged their presence
through passive protection and by spending wages in the market. Finally, the IC burnished the international reputation of the black market activity taking place within Arizona Market until it took on a luster
of free market legitimacy that it had not earned. From the beginning,
the international refrain was that while the rest of Bosnia was mired in
ethnic hatred, men (not women) of different ethnic groups happily
22
interacted in Arizona Market with business as their neutral ground.

16

BENJAMIN FEIT & MICHAEL MORFIT, A NEUTRAL SPACE 3 (n.d.) (on file with author).
Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 42, 52.
18
For the first two to three years after the war, roads that crossed former frontlines or divided entities were not frequented by civilians, who feared attack and reprisal when their license plates identified them as being from particular parts of the
country and therefore potentially linked to particular ethnic groups. Many of these
roads were used primarily or only by internationals.
19
The “Republika Srpska” was “created” in early 1992 by indicted war criminal
Radovan Karadžic’s party, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and then proclaimed
itself to be part of Yugoslavia (Serbia) rather than Bosnia. See LAURA SILBER ET AL.,
THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA 218 (rev. ed. 1996).
20
See Associated Press, U.S. Troops Mark End of Mission in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 2004, at A19.
21
See infra notes 23-27.
22
Cf. Fontenot, supra note 15, at 211-12.
17
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In fact, the IC got it wrong in many respects. Although men of
different ethnic groups did do business there, as often as not they
were not even from Bosnia, undermining the claim that the market
would create interethnic harmony amongst Bosnians. Rather, Serbs
from Serbia; Croats from Croatia; and internationals from Romania,
Moldova, and Bulgaria were the groups actually taking advantage of
the unregulated market by engaging in mutually beneficial organized
crime and smuggling. The myth that Arizona Market was the venue in
which Bosnian citizens were finally interacting peaceably after years of
warring with one another is at best an extreme exaggeration. But this
is not the only myth surrounding Arizona Market.
In Bosnia, there are conflicting narratives about most things hav23
ing to do with the war—who started it, when, where, how, and why —
and the story of how Arizona Market was created is no exception.
One narrative says that the market sprang up spontaneously in the
months after Dayton as a motley collection of vendors servicing North
24
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping troops. The International Forces (IFOR), supplied by NATO countries and a precursor to SFOR, patrolled the area and established security checkpoints,
which were critical given the location of the market where Bosnian,
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb interests—and territories—
25
converged. Because the area was relatively safe thanks to the IFOR
26
patrols, people began coming to “exchange cows and other goods.”
Another version of the narrative says that the American unit of IFOR
affirmatively established the market as a secure trading area during
the conflict based on the belief that it would be crucial to the stability
27
of the region.

23

See Dina Francesca Haynes, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONsupra note 4, at xv-xviii (introducing some of the variations in the narratives of the war).
24
See, e.g., PETER ANDREAS, BLUE HELMETS AND BLACK MARKETS: THE BUSINESS OF
SURVIVAL IN THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO 133-34 (2008) (stating that the market emerged near
peacekeeping troop stations and a former NATO checkpoint as well as several brothels).
25
The strategic importance of the location of the market is discussed further below. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
26
See ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 133 (quoting a spokesperson for the Brcko District
Office of the High Representative (OHR)).
27
See Alex Jeffrey, Building State Capacity in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: The
Case of Brcko District, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 203, 216 (2006) (claiming that IFOR troops established the market during the conflict and that it was subsequently privatized in 2001
by an Italian-Bosnian company (citing Peter Andreas, The Clandestine Political Economy of
War and Peace in Bosnia, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 29, 46 (2004))); see also ANDREAS, supra note
24, at 134 (“The market was encouraged . . . . One way to move forward in the post war
STRUCTION,
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Regardless of how it actually started, because of its proximity to
Brcko and America’s investment in the Dayton Framework and later
Brcko itself, the market was immediately hailed as a sign of multiethnic cooperation. The hyperbole was then further exaggerated by the
international actors, who were primarily experts in military operations
and political science, not economics. They saw a link between commerce and multiethnic interaction and quickly determined that warring ethnicities would set aside old animosities in favor of making
money—it was the neoliberal free market concept embodied in the
28
perfect microcosm of Arizona Market.
The United States provided financial support for the market, with
29
the Pentagon donating $40,000 toward its establishment. In recognition of its contribution, a plaque thanking the U.S. Army was posted
publicly at Arizona Market, where it remained until it later became an
embarrassment and was removed. By 1998, three years after the formal conclusion of the war, Arizona Market offered DVDs pirated in
China, goods looted from the ransacked homes of ethnically displaced
persons, building materials stolen from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that had donated them to rebuild homes, fake Nike
30
running shoes, heroin, and human slaves.
years was to use business as a foundation. To use an American phrase, the market was in
‘everyone’s interest.’” (quoting Michael Montgomery of the Brcko District OHR)).
28
This myopia can be ascribed, as David Kanin puts it, to “the mythology of the benign, universal applicability of democracy and free markets.” David B. Kanin, Big Men,
Corruption, and Crime, 40 INT’L POL. 491, 492 (2003). Although he goes on to argue that
by endorsing this mythology, the IC fails to seriously confront corruption and economic
criminal activity, he characterizes this mythology as created by western imperialism because “Europeans (and Americans) believe themselves to be ‘ahead’ of the rest of the
world and authorized to judge how far behind others happen to be.” Id. at 493.
29
See Gina Cavallaro, The Lessons Learned in Bosnia and How They Apply to Iraq, AIR
FORCE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/
1-292925-543796.php (quoting Major General William Nash, who explained that the
Pentagon had paid some of the Arizona Market start-up costs because “the area was
secure so Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs could all come and do business without fear of
ethnic violence . . . . Over the years the Arizona Market has had an up and down existence with some issues of black marketing, trafficking in literally drug [sic], sex and
rock and roll.”).
30
See Philip Sherwell, Guns, Girls, Drugs, Fake Track Suits—It’s All Here in the Wildest
Market in the World, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2000, at 35, available at
Factiva (explaining that Arizona Market “has become a byword not just for business
but also for crime”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HOPES BETRAYED: TRAFFICKING OF
WOMEN AND GIRLS TO POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR FORCED PROSTITUTION 62-63 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/bosnia/
Bosnia1102.pdf (providing sworn testimony of U.S. government contractors who purchased prostitutes at Arizona Market); Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested
and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure
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The nefarious market became so well-known in the region for being both unregulated and protected that Albanians, Moldovans, Romanians, and others also came there to conduct their business. Arizona Market had gone international, becoming “a cross-communal
trading place in no-man’s land where ethnic belonging and citizen31
ship mattered little and everything was for sale.”
Even if the IC did not literally create the market, they funded it
and imbued it with a powerful myth—that the market was a microcosm of how all of Bosnia could be, with the free market correcting
even the sort of ethnic hatred that leads to violent war. The people
on the ground—primarily military actors presumably present for their
military, and not their economic, skills—held to the belief that
[i]n the microcosm the Arizona Market represents may lie a clue to
building a functioning multiethnic society in Bosnia. At least for now,
people feel secure only when surrounded by their own kind. But as economic opportunity invites interaction, these same people will gradually
32
become confident that they can live again in a mixed society.

There were multiple problems with this Pollyanna view of Arizona
Market. In addition to being economically flawed, particularly be33
cause it ignores the female portion of the population, this view ignores the fact that many of the market’s activities were both illegal
and extraordinarily abusive. Even the relatively “victimless” black
market sales were harmful because they avoided taxation in a country
34
that sorely needed a tax base. Worse still, the market was tolerated
by precisely the people whose job it was to guide Bosnia toward a fair,
structured, and rehabilitated rule-of-law system—the IC.
In the years following the peace accords, the example of Arizona
Market continued to be trotted out by the IC to bolster support for
continued funding of projects related to economic liberalization and
the return and reintegration of displaced persons, and to stave off the
growing arguments that Bosnia might be better off as an ethnically di-

the Prosecution of Traffickers, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 222 (2004) (describing the plight of a
sixteen-year-old Moldovan girl who was sold as a prostitute at Arizona Market).
31
Florian Bieber, Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and
Brcko, 12 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 420, 421 (2005).
32
Boyd, supra note 17, at 52-53.
33
See infra Section III.C (considering the exclusion of women from reconstruction
efforts).
34
See R. Jeffrey Smith, Bosnian Mart Becomes Den of Criminal Enterprise, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 1999, at A33 (explaining that by 1999, Bosnia was losing “an estimated $30
million a year from untaxed sales of legal goods” in Arizona Market).
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35

vided country. Eventually, this belief that market forces would prevail and correct years of ethnic hatred led the IC to turn a blind eye to
36
the gruesome activity taking place within the market. Human be37
ings, in this case exclusively women and children, were being sold.
Buyers purchased not just the services of prostitutes but human beings
wholesale—people were sold as slaves. Human beings were treated as
mere commodities. Was this to be viewed as an acceptable collateral
consequence of the unregulated market at work?
While human rights and the rule of law were discussed and
38
planned for in other parts of Bosnia, they were blatantly violated in
Arizona Market with the full acquiescence of the IC, which insisted
that the market represented the highest expression of free market
ideals. Eventually it was publicly acknowledged that women and girls
were being trafficked through Arizona Market. Later still, it was recognized, if not formally acknowledged by the IC at large, that some of
the perpetrators purchasing and even selling women at Arizona Mar39
ket were themselves members of the IC. The presence of the IC in
Bosnia, their endorsement of the market, and their activities within
the market had contributed significantly to the problem by creating
the demand for black market dealings and human trafficking within
the region.

35

See Boyd, supra note 17, at 52-53 (supporting the view that Arizona Market showed
how market forces and market needs would slowly allow people to set aside hostility in
favor of making money); see also Kanin, supra note 28, at 513 (arguing that Arizona Market is “the prototype of both the problem [of corruption and criminal economic activity]
and its solution” but also noting that “‘rule of law’ . . . more likely would emerge from
spontaneous, informal economic activity than from externally imposed administration”).
But see Timothy William Waters, Assuming Bosnia: Taking Polities Seriously in Ethnically Divided States (controverting the view of Bosnia as a paradigm of justice, and providing arguments for an open dialogue about future ethnic divisions in the country), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 53, 69-78.
36
See John McGhie, Women for Sale, RED PEPPER (U.K.), Aug. 2000, at 16, 17
(“Apart from one or two anti-traffickers there is little sense that this is a major issue.
And if the U.N. chiefs know what is going on, there is hardly a feeling of urgency in
combating it.”).
37
No evidence has surfaced that men or boys were trafficked through Arizona Market.
38
Many international actors were involved in this planning: the OHR (acting as
international administrative agency); the OSCE; and multiple U.N. agencies, including
the UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
39
See Sherwell, supra note 30; discussion infra note 64.
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C. Politico- and Socioeconomic Engineering: The Story of
Brcko and Its Relationship to Arizona Market
The story of Arizona Market cannot be told without an understanding of the unique town of Brcko. The Dayton Peace Accords
brought to the table indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic from
Serbia (who died before the conclusion of his trial), Franjo Tudjman
from Croatia (who might well have been indicted had he lived), and
Alija Izetbegovic from Bosnia (often criticized, but never indicted) to
40
negotiate cessation of hostilities. The final sticking point at Dayton,
which threatened to undo all of the preceding negotiations, was what
41
should be done with the town of Brcko.
Strategically located along both the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and
the Sava River, in the northeast of Bosnia, the town of Brcko joins Bosnia to the rest of the former Yugoslavia and Europe. It is an extremely
important geographic location from any economic standpoint but was
42
especially important to the Bosnian Serbs. Despite being a majority
Bosniak (and Muslim) town before the war, Brcko was the geographic
link connecting the eastern and western parts of the Republika Srpska.
Without control over Brcko, the Serb Republic would be divided in two
43
parts, which would amount to any military strategist’s nightmare.
In order to gain control over this territory during the war, the
44
Bosnian Serbs, led by “Arkan,” decimated the town. Bosnian Serbs
forcibly expelled Bosniaks and Croats, and many were tortured, raped,
40

There were other men at the table—international diplomats—but of course no
women, a situation that has been described as a failure to “reimagine gender relations
and to provide a contemporary model of citizenship and democracy for women.”
Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 103, 112 (2001); see also Rees, supra
note 12, at 54-55 (reporting that the individuals who negotiated the Dayton Accords
“were almost all men”); Cynthia Cockburn, The Postwar Moment: Lessons from Bosnia
Herzegovina, WOMEN & ENV’TS INT’L MAG., Spring 2003, at 6, 6-7 (explaining the lack
of female representation). This gender disparity was lost on the negotiators and parties but not on the women’s NGO Kvinna till Kvinna, which sent a letter to Madeleine
Albright on the day of the signing of the Accords without result. Rees, supra note 12,
at 55; see also infra Parts III-IV.
41
Muhamed Sacirbey, Brcko Poker, EUR. COURIER, Mar. 17, 2009, http://
www.europeancourier.org/171.htm.
42
See Fontenot, supra note 15, at 201 (“The city was the center of gravity both in
military and economic terms; it was the place at which success had to be obtained.”).
43
See id.; see also Sacirbey, supra note 41.
44
Arkan, whose real name was Zeljko Raznatovic, was indicted for war crimes after
the war but never tried because he was gunned down in the lobby of Belgrade’s Intercontinental Hotel in January 2000. Steven Erlanger, Suspect in Serbian War Crimes Murdered by Masked Gunmen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 1.
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45

and killed. There were said to be twenty camps around the town of
Brcko during the war, in which many of those who had been forcibly
46
expelled were subsequently held captive.
As a consequence of the war and expulsions, the town split into
three submunicipalities after the war: Ravne-Brcko (the Croat section,
which would initially host Arizona Market), Brcko Grad (housing the
Serb population in the town center), and Brcko-Rahic (the Bosniak
47
section). During the war, as Bosnian Serbs were displaced from Sara48
jevo, other parts of Bosnia, and Croatia, they were provided with
housing (both homes and socially owned apartments) that had formerly belonged to the expelled or imprisoned Bosniaks and Croats.
This sort of ethnic displacement was taking place all over Bosnia,
Croatia, and Serbia and affected all ethnic groups. As each ethnic
minority group was forced out or fled, a newly arrived ethnic group
would be given their “abandoned” homes, creating new ethnic majori49
50
In Brcko, the wartime ethnic violence and displacement
ties.
51
created a strategic Serb majority.

45

See id.; Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 205 (“The importance of Brcko . . . translated to
a series of atrocities against the Bosniak and Croat inhabitants of the town . . . .”).
46
See Peter Popham, Winning the Peace in the Balkans: Risen from the Ashes of War,
INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 18, 2005, at 30, available at LEXIS (discussing how over
30,000 Bosniaks and Croats were driven to prison camps outside Brcko). The most
notorious of these camps was the luka (port) camp, where such brutal crimes and massacres took place that camp leaders Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cešic were indicted for
crimes against humanity. See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 206 (situating these massacres
within a larger attempt by Serbian forces to destroy all symbols of cultural heterogeneity and replace them with Serbian historical and cultural markers).
47
See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215.
48
Between 150,000 and 200,000 Krajina Serbs were expelled from Croatia over a
thirty-six-hour period during “Operation Storm” in August 1995, when the Croatian
army, trained by a U.S. military firm in an arrangement approved by the U.S. government, forcibly expelled ethnic Serbs and killed many. See Impunity for War Crimes Must
End, GLOBAL POL’Y F., Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/
content/article/168/29343.html (linking the EU’s delay of accession negotiations with
Croatia to murders and other crimes committed during Operation Storm); Srdja Trifkovic, The Really Bad Dogs of War, CHRONICLES, Oct. 11, 2007, available at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7052 (identifying MPRI as
the American firm that trained Croat forces in preparation for Operation Storm); Neven Crvenkovic, Home Again: 10 Years After Croatia’s Operation Storm (Aug. 5,
2005), http://www.unhcr.org/42f38b084.html (noting the large influx of Serbs into
Yugoslavia and the expulsion of non-Serbs in 1991 preceding Operation Storm’s expulsion of Serbs).
49
See infra Section IV.D (discussing further the laws used to implement this property-based ethnic cleansing). In Croatia, this was further complicated by thenPresident Franjo Tudjman’s invitation to Bosnian Croats to move to Croatia and take
up residence in homes and flats “abandoned” by Krajina Serbs. Id. These displace-
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At the very end of the Dayton peace negotiations, when all else
had been agreed upon save the fate of Brcko, Milosevic told negotia52
tor Richard Holbrooke that he would “walk the final mile for peace”
by giving up on the stalemate, which in any case would have benefitted Bosnian Serbs rather than his country, Serbia. Milosevic suggested
53
submitting the Brcko issue to arbitration. Holbrooke accepted this
solution, and an American along with entity representatives from Bosnia were appointed to arbitrate the issue of Brcko. Brcko was then
filled with American troops, and a U.S. Department of State diplomat
54
was appointed to “supervise” the town. Eventually, in 1999, Brcko
was made an autonomous district and a full protectorate under the
authority of an American international administrator, who appointed
(contrary to the democratic principles of electing local officials) all
55
local authorities until 2004.
The rehabilitation of the town was fully engineered by the IC,
which was heavily influenced by the Americans. Despite this outside
influence, or more probably because of it, Brcko has been praised ultimately as a success story, even by such notoriously critical watchdogs
56
as the International Crisis Group. Still, when understanding how

ment and housing issues cannot be understood without also looking at Croatia, Serbia,
and even Kosovo. Id.
50
This was arguably only nationalist violence because most Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks share a common ethnic Slavic origin.
51
Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 205-06.
52
Popham, supra note 46, at 30-31 (quoting Slobodan Milosevic).
53
See id. (suggesting that “Dayton succeeded because Brcko . . . was set aside to be
decided later”).
54
See Haynes, supra note 4, at 13 & n.17 (arguing that the international political
arrangement in Brcko emulated somewhat General MacArthur’s governance in Japan
after World War II); Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 209.
55
Even the word for the new protectorate, distrikt, was based on the American governance and electoral concept of “districts,” while the rest of Bosnia was organized in
opstinas. This linguistic anomaly is further evidence of the total U.S. control of Brcko
and its postwar administration.
56
See Mark Landler, Strong Hand and a Little Cash Can Help Revive Ethnic Peace: Nation-Building/Success Story in Bosnia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 2003, at 2, available at
LEXIS (quoting Mark Wheeler, director of the Bosnia Project at the International Crisis Group, as stating that Brcko was “the worst place you could imagine in Bosnia . . . . But the international community equipped people with enough authority to
get their jobs done.”); see also Bieber, supra note 31, at 431 (“Brcko has been and probably will be a model for institutional design in other regions . . . .”); Jeffrey, supra note
27, at 204 (“The experience of Brcko encourages reflection on the ways through which
international and local state organisations have worked together to create sustainable
practices of multi-ethnic government in post-conflict Bosnia.”). But see INT’L CRISIS
GROUP, BRCKO: WHAT BOSNIA COULD BE 1 (1998) (explaining that, at the time of the
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economic and political engineering in Brcko helped create Arizona
Market, it is important to note that the terms of arbitration that
created Brcko also yielded a tax and customs structure independent
from Bosnia’s. This imbued the town with instantly attractive neoliberal economic advantages and infinitely better economic possibilities
57
than the rest of Bosnia. A considerable amount of the tax base for
Brcko eventually came from Arizona Market, and still does.
Because the United States had such influence over the reconstruc58
tion of the Brcko District, it is not a stretch to imagine how the idea
of something like Arizona Market arose. Situated right outside of
Brcko and ostensibly stimulating the multiethnic harmony for which
the IC strived and for which the United States negotiated at the Dayton Peace Accords, the creation of the market was only natural.
If Arizona Market was an experiment in capitalism, then Brcko
was an experiment in democratization. The early narrative surrounding Brcko’s “governance by fiat” model was often harshly critical of
the model for purporting to create a democracy, even while relying
59
upon autocracy. By contrast, Arizona Market tended to be praised as
60
a freewheeling, free market, harmonizing force. And the positive
“free market fosters ethnic harmony” narrative persisted, even once
61
the market’s seedy underbelly was exposed.
report’s publication, the International Supervisor had only seen “mixed” results in his
plans to revitalize Brcko).
57
See EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA
17-18 (2004) (noting that although, like the rest of Bosnia, Brcko was under international supervision, Brcko “had by far the highest level of public salaries in the whole
country”). Brcko differed from the rest of Bosnia in many respects, but in being subject to international supervision, it was similar. The rest of Bosnia was being “supervised” by the High Representative, who represented the member states that comprised
the Peace Implementation Council, a group of interested states primarily affiliated
with NATO. Unlike other peace operations, the U.N. played a lesser role and the primary role of reconstruction was given to the OHR. Brcko was also being reconstructed
by the Supervisor, appointed through the Dayton-initiated arbitration.
58
For example, in addition to the fact that Brcko’s supervisors were American diplomats, the organization created to run Brcko’s institutions was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)–funded “District Management Team,” which was assisted by
U.S. consulting firms. See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215-16 (highlighting the Supervisor’s essentially unchallenged power in designating the instruments of democratization).
59
See DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA: FAKING DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON 1-3 (1999)
(“Three years of intensive involvement by the world’s most powerful states . . . has
done little to create viable institutions of self-government in the state.”).
60
See, e.g., ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 132-33 (calling Arizona Market “the most impressive evidence” of “the ability to overcome ethnic divides” within a “clandestine economy”).
61
Political scientists have made interesting arguments about why the dark, inscrutable, and private nature of the market would suit the locals adequately, even aside
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The democracy of Brcko was a strange sort of democracy, a sort of
autocratic democracy wherein the International Supervisor appointed
all local officials. Even Bosnia’s high school history books ended with
World War II, as no one was prepared to take on the task of developing a text describing the more recent regional war that might be satis62
factory to all three ethnicities. Similarly, the capitalism of Arizona
Market was a strange sort of capitalism in which recently warring
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks joined together in nefarious business ventures, including the sale of human beings for profit.
D. Human Trafficking at Arizona Market
There are no nice human trafficking stories, but at Arizona Market, human trafficking was particularly grim and came closest to
matching the now-pervasive moniker “modern day slavery.” At Arizona Market, women, and often girls, were “order[ed] to take off all
63
their clothes and . . . stand[] [in] the road naked . . . like cattle.”
The presence of 50,000 or more international men in Bosnia as
part of the peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, usually without
their female partners, created a demand for women who could be
64
hired for sex.
The black marketeers, who had already become

from a desire to prevent their illegal black market and private-sphere activity from
coming to light. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 53-54 (1998) (explaining that developing an inscrutable infrastructure protects the governing elites against invasion by newcomers who do not understand how to get around, literally or figuratively, and thus fail
both to see what is truly happening right under their noses and to take control of and
change it to suit their tastes).
62
See Landler, supra note 56 (quoting a Brcko high-school student who said, “[W]e
don’t know anything about the war . . . . Our history class ends with World War II.”).
63
Michael Voss, ‘Slave Trade’ Thrives in Bosnia: High Unemployment Makes
Women Easy Prey (Mar. 8, 2001), http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/ukraine/
slavebosnia.htm (quoting Mara Radovanovic). This has led some to refer to Arizona
Market, without irony, as a “women market.” Id.; see also Michael Harris, Horror Under
the Covers, OTTAWA SUN, Oct. 24, 2003, at 15 (reviewing VICTOR MALAREK, THE NATASHAS: INSIDE THE NEW GLOBAL SEX TRADE (2003)); McGhie, supra note 36, at 16-17
(calling Arizona Market “the biggest slave market in Europe,” and stating that
“[i]nternational police based in Brcko said women are often put on stage in a backroom bar, pirouetting in different costumes while buyers inspect their flesh and look
into the women’s mouths before making a bid. The more attractive ones fetch
DM2,000-DM4,000 (£650-£1,300).”).
64
See McGhie, supra note 36, at 17 (quoting Madeleine Rees, then head of the
UNHCHR in Bosnia, as saying, “‘If you look at the patterns of trafficking world-wide,
essentially you only get it where you’re going to have a market,’ says Rees. ‘It’s a demand-led thing, and basically in 1993 we had the presence of Unprofor (UN Protec-
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skilled at operating across borders and outside of the law, quickly satisfied that demand with a supply of women and girls who had few
65
other economic prospects. The traffickers lured these women out of
their communities almost always under false pretenses. The traffickers usually told the women that they would be taken into Western Eu66
rope to work as hostesses, nannies, or hotel staff.
Instead, the women were bought and sold like chattels. Once put
to work in brothels, the women were trapped in debt peonage, under
which they were forced to pay off the “debt” of their own purchase
67
and transport.
The women, who came primarily from Moldova,
Ukraine, and Romania, were available in large part due to the collaps68
This economic
ing socialist economies in their home countries.
turmoil was arguably exacerbated by the neoliberal economic policies
that the IC imposed on these collapsing economies. According to the
UNDP, more than 10,000 women and girls (and possibly some men
and boys) were trafficked through Arizona Market in the year 2000
alone. Traffickers used Arizona Market as a hub for women trafficked
into the rest of the Former Yugoslavia and on to Western Europe,
69
Israel, and Turkey. The elements of organized crime that coordi70
Traffickers frenated the trafficking were extremely dangerous.

tion Force—the military predecessor of the Stabilisation Force, Sfor), and undoubtedly
that was one of the pull factors.’”).
65
See also infra Part IV (arguing that the IC also played a role in creating the
supply of women through creation of regional economic policies that increased unemployment and particularly the unemployment of women).
66
See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 30, at 222 (relating the story of a Moldovan girl
whose brother-in-law promised to find her a job as a hostess in Italy but then sold her
into slavery in Bosnia); Rees, supra note 12, at 57.
67
See David Binder, In a Postwar Zone, the Sex Trade Flourishes, MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/?id=3071976 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“[Women are]
bought and sold constantly. At the ‘Arizona Market’ . . . they sell women like animals.
They have to pay off the cost of their own sale. [The women] earn from $50 an hour
to $500 a night [for the brothel owners], but are paid between $100 and as little as $13
a month.” (quoting Nidia Casati of the International Organization for Migration)).
68
See, e.g., Denise Horn, Bringing Moldova’s Women into the Democratization Process,
RADIOFREEEUROPE/RADIOLIBERTY, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/
Bringing_Moldovas_Women_Into_The_Democratization_Process/1927570.html (discussing trafficking during the economic transition in Moldova).
69
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT
2000: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 31 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/10815.pdf; see also Grave problème de traite des femmes en Bosnie
selon l’ONU, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 2000, available at WL.
70
See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]he conflict in the
Balkans facilitated heroin transit to Europe through that region . . . [such] that the
flood of refugees and migrants from the combat areas towards the EU [saw] the emer-
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quently beat their victims, and as of 1999, authorities had found ten
women murdered, ostensibly by their traffickers. One of these murder victims was discovered with her mouth taped shut with tape bearing the symbol and name of the OSCE, a bold statement that the traffickers felt free to operate as brutally as necessary. This was not only
in spite of the international presence but largely because the international security and development personnel economically supported
71
and drove the illicit market in women.
By 1999, it was well-known that peacekeepers and other internationals were spending time in Arizona Market—purchasing sex, buying
72
women, and sometimes even selling them. Nevertheless, when High

gence of the formidable Albanian mafias, whose role in several cases involving narcotics, illegal immigration and prostitution has been demonstrated.”).
71
McGhie argues that the tape on the murder victims’ mouths was also a message
to women that
organised crime . . . will not tolerate women speaking out.
The problems in fighting trafficking are legion. Corruption is endemic;
there is a prevailing culture where it is all right to visit brothels and most local
police are unwilling to tackle the ‘low priority’ problem.
McGhie, supra note 36, at 17.
72
With the arrival of internationals creating demand for women who could be
hired for sex, brothels sprang up all over the region, not just in Arizona Market. It was
estimated that thirty percent of the clients and eighty percent of the traffickers’ revenue came from the IC. Rees, supra note 12, at 63. Although some members of the IC
were instrumental in successfully liberating trafficked women, “there [were] numerous
allegations that members of the international police force were involved in the trafficking.” UN Police Officers Resign After Raid, U.N. WIRE, Nov. 30, 2000, http://
www.unwire.org/unwire/20001130/11995_story.asp. For example, an American U.N.
officer was dismissed after buying a Moldovan woman for $2900. Colum Lynch, Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission, WASH. POST, May 29, 2001, at A1.
Military subcontractors were also involved in illegal activity. By 1998, eight employees
of a large subcontracting firm, Dyncorp, had been relieved of their duties in Bosnia
after allegations of their participation in sex trafficking arose. Antony Barnett & Solomon Hughes, British Firm Accused in UN ‘Sex Scandal,’ OBSERVER (London), July 29,
2001, at 4; see also Haynes, supra note 30, at 236-37 (discussing the complicity of peacekeepers and international workers in prostitution and trafficking). NATO soldiers and
Italian, Portuguese, and Egyptian SFOR troops were accused of forcing twelve- to fourteen-year-old girls to have sex with them, although NATO dismissed the allegations
after it conducted its own internal investigation. Nancy L. Torner, No Evidence of Crimes
by SFOR Troops, UPI, Aug. 25, 1998, available at LEXIS. But see McGhie, supra note 36,
at 17 (listing evidence supporting the claim that U.N. and NGO personnel used trafficked women for sex). McGhie catalogues the evidence in this way:
x
[A] UN report, unpublished outside Bosnia, [spoke] of “compelling
evidence of complicity” of local and international police and Sfor in
14 cases [as of 1999];
x
four other cases [as of 1999], one involving Sfor and three the International Police Task Force (IPTF), where men had trafficked women;
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Representative Wolfgang Petrisch belatedly tried to shut down Arizona
Market, calling it a “lawless wasteland,” an American colonel argued to
keep it open, pointing out by way of comparison that Times Square in
New York City was far from perfect with its own host of pimps and pros73
titutes. Such statements suggest that a “boys will be boys” mentality
was accepted by some as a justification for the improper behavior of
military and international personnel participating in postconflict reconstruction work. The reasoning was that military personnel who were involved in risky and demanding work so far from home ought at least to
74
This acceptance of prostitute use
be allowed the comfort of sex.
among internationals was bolstered by the misconception that the
women had freely chosen their “profession” and wanted to be involved
75
in the illegal activities taking place at Arizona Market.
However, even once it became apparent that the prostitutes were
actually trafficked women and that the brothels held women against
their will, no crackdown was immediately forthcoming. The myth of
the free market insulated Arizona Market from being seen for what it
was—a place where the worst kind of human behaviors were perpetrated against women and girls, with the complicity and involvement
of the very internationals tasked with bringing about peace and security. The belief that anything that normalized Bosnia was helpful and
that trade is as normal as it gets justified the activities that took place
in the market. This belief trumped proof that criminal, abusive, coerx
x
x
x
x

in one small IPTF base two officers admitted to us they regularly visited brothels where they knew trafficked women were held;
five IPTF officers were recently sent home for being caught in raids
on brothels;
a number of staff (unconfirmed reports say six) from the Office of
High Representative—the most senior UN body in Bosnia—were also recently caught in a brothel raid;
we saw, and filmed, European Union vehicles parked outside a well
known Sarajevo brothel, and saw UN vehicles outside other brothels;
we secretly filmed a senior US member of the international community in a brothel boasting about how easy it was to buy a woman
“as property.”

Id.
73

Bruce R. Scott & Edward N. Murphy, Brcko and the Arizona Market, HARV. BUS.
REV., Aug. 4, 2006, at 1, 17.
74
For more discussion of this attitude, see generally NAOMI CAHN, DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES & FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN, ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER AND POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION (forthcoming 2010).
75
See McGhie, supra note 36, at 17 (observing the sentiment of many internationals in Bosnia that the trafficked women “look happy enough and if they get their money, what’s the fuss about?”).
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cive, and exploitative activity—not “normal” trade—was taking place
in Arizona Market.
Many gender scholars from the Former Yugoslavia, aware of the
gravity of human trafficking in Bosnia, frame the problem as a horrific
derivative of development and neoliberalism:
There are many sovereign exceptions a variety of state agents can and do
grant themselves/ourselves routinely, with horrible consequences for local development and for humanitarian/human outcomes. There are also brutal local transitions that defy any sense that the world is moving in
generally democratic directions. It is important to . . . see and address
76
more of the troubling biopolitics of our times.

Human trafficking in and through Bosnia was a derivative of development in that the massive influx of predominantly male military personnel, peacekeepers, humanitarian officers, and supply teams
charged with reconstructing Bosnia after the war created the market
for trafficked women and girls. Arizona Market is likewise derivative
of neoliberalism because those very same military personnel, peacekeepers, and humanitarian officers trusted the market to create a
77
place of social justice and to correct for any abuses. Thus, the forces
that created Arizona Market and allowed it to thrive were also the
consumers of its abusively obtained human “goods.”
In December 2001, Arizona Market was privatized, falling in line
with the rest of the Bosnian capitalist progress plan. The winning bid
for the market came from an Italian-Bosnian company called ItalPro78
jekt. Despite the move to privatize, however, the market remained
rife with lawlessness, attracting bad actors and bad activities that some79
times spilled over to areas surrounding the market. The organized76

Christine Sylvester, Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic, 172 GEO66, 75-76 (2006).
77
See infra Section III.B (discussing neoliberalism and some of its definitions, as
well as some aspects of development theory).
78
See Jeffrey, supra note 27, at 215-16 (“ItalProjekt reopened [Arizona Market] in 2004
as [sic] out-of-town mall and tourist attraction.”); see also Peter Moertenboeck & Helge Mooshammer, Trading Places, NETWORKED CULTURES, http://www.networkedcultures.org/
index.php?tdid=85 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“[Arizona Market is now said to host] 2,500
stalls and shops sprawling over 25 hectares of land, 3 million visitors per year and some
20,000 people employed by the market.”).
79
In October 2001, I was driving back to Belgrade from Sarajevo with another international in his organization’s vehicle, which was white with diplomatic plates. As we
neared Arizona Market at night, a body went flying up into the air, landing in the road
in front of our car. The car in front of us, which had hit this person, pulled over momentarily and then sped away. We stopped and I held the man as he died barefoot,
having literally been thrown out of his shoes, which my colleague found further up the
road. Although the area was populated with bars, brothels, and cafés, only a few
GRAPHICAL J.
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crime bosses running the market were not happy with its purchase by
ItalProjekt, as they lost a substantial amount of money via increased
80
taxes to the municipality of Brcko-Ravne. The stall owners continued to pay the same amount they had always paid to operate their
stalls, but the money was no longer being directed to the shadow
81
bosses; it was now a formal tax. Despite any loss of profits from the
reorganization and privatization, as of 2003, the market was still referred to as “a sprawling, seedy collection of hawkers who have set up
82
stalls on the edge of town.” By 2008, although “commercialized” and
privately operated, Arizona Market was still thriving as a hub for crim83
inal activity, black marketeering, and money laundering.
II. MAJOR FLAWS IN POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
The postconflict reconstruction process is as much to blame for the
creation of a place like Arizona Market as much as are the particular
people present at the cessation of hostilities. Critiques of postconflict
reconstruction include that it is too reactive and not thoughtful or reflective enough; that the entire process lacks clear doctrine; that the
players on the ground tend to make decisions far beyond their skill levels or outside their areas of expertise; and that the entire process risks
being driven by the interests of available donors and financiers rather
than by any coherent developing doctrine, local needs assessments, or
lessons learned in prior postconflict reconstruction scenarios.
people came to the scene of the accident to see what had happened. Cars approaching behind us slowed down but then pulled around us and continued on. Eventually,
one man approached on foot but before coming too near us said in an urgent tone,
“Get out of here! Someone will come and blame you.” We replied that we had not hit
the victim and that the man was a witness to that fact. Nonetheless, the man responded, “But there is no way we will talk to police about this,” and he left. We eventually
drove on and reported the incident at the nearest police station. The police shrugged
and said that there were always drunks and people wandering around Arizona Market
looking for trouble, as if this death were inconsequential.
80
See Landler, supra note 56 (explaining that the developers planned on transforming Arizona Market from a “Third World bazaar into a first-world shopping center”); see also Sherwell, supra note 30 (quoting an OHR spokesperson as saying that the
OHR had “created a monster” in depriving Brcko of its tax revenue by allowing the
black market economy to persist).
81
Landler, supra note 56; Sherwell, supra note 30.
82
Landler, supra note 56.
83
See, e.g., Željko Rogošic, Hunt for the Pale Gang: Search for the Split Robbers, NACIONAL (Zagreb, Croat.), May 12, 2008, available at http://www.nacional.hr/
en/clanak/45428/search-for-the-split-robbers (explaining that after robbing the Croatian postal service in Split, one of the thieves involved was arrested trying to exchange
350,000 kuna at the Arizona Market).
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A. Lack of Postconflict Doctrine Addressing Women
In postconflict reconstruction, there are no playbooks save the
agreements that may have been drafted during peace negotiations. In
Bosnia, the Dayton Framework served as a sort of legal working document for aiding organizations and signatories in moving from the
cessation of hostilities to sustainable peace and security. Because the
guiding documents, like the Dayton Framework, are often broad and
vague, the people assigned to carry out the practical tasks of reconstruction have tremendous power to shape the entire dynamic of the
84
country being reconstructed.
Since there are no set rules for handling postconflict reconstruc85
tion, those leading reconstruction efforts must navigate anew, usually
with little consideration of what has come before. There is some wisdom in this approach, since peace negotiations and postconflict reconstruction plans must be country specific, taking into account the country’s culture, history, and past conflict. Despite the flexibility afforded
by approaching such situations with a blank slate, there is one reason to
be highly critical of this method: the air of extreme urgency that inevitably surrounds such uncharted negotiations. The lack of a clear path to
follow creates a sense that the peace terms need to be locked in immediately and urgently, while the details can be revised later. As the Dayton Framework demonstrates, however, far more than the simple peace
terms are at stake in this process. In Dayton, the entire plan for the
long-term reconstruction of Bosnia, including the plan to create a market economy, was set in motion. In the rush to create a plan, the negotiators failed to consider gender issues and did not address the particular needs of women in the aftermath of the conflict.
86
Gender “mainstreaming,” a concept which began making its way
into development parlance and official U.N. resolutions at the turn of
the century, has failed to become a meaningful part of postconflict reconstruction plans. Too often, individualized conflict negotiations,
filled with a sense of urgency, leave gender mainstreaming in the lurch
and focus instead only on what is needed to secure peace in the immediate short term. After the horrific gender-based crimes carried out in
Bosnia during and after the war, this approach is simply unacceptable.
84

See Haynes, supra note 4, at 25-27 (arguing that the IC has too much power and
not enough expertise or guidance in carrying out effective postconflict reconstruction).
85
Documents such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 arguably constitute
an exception. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
86
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (acknowledging
“the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations”).
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Surely, the security of equity and rights for women deserves at least
equal consideration with the creation of a market economy, a project
87
considered by negotiators to be crucial for immediate peace in Bosnia.
The term “gender mainstreaming” is now used quite commonly
among U.N. agencies and in democratization efforts, particularly
with regard to the development of so-called “hard” civil and political
88
rights. A concentration on civil and political rights means that, at
best, women will be inserted into public office—by quota if necessary—or included in electoral and party lists. In some instances, facilitators of gender mainstreaming recognize that in order for women to access their political and civil rights, they may have to be
educated on the voting process, and alternative voting processes may
89
need to be provided where women are largely illiterate. In general,
however, gender mainstreaming fails to be included broadly or regu90
larly in peacemaking and peacebuilding plans. Even though gender equity is now officially required by international organizations, it
will continue to be ignored until it is included in a formula for postconflict reconstruction.
87

This is evidenced by the fact that the drafters of the Dayton Framework Agreement for Peace included these provisions within the document. See infra note 126 and
Section III.B (discussing the Framework provisions with regard to market liberalization); see also CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (arguing that inclusion of
gender considerations is crucial to longer-term postconflict stability).
88
“Hard” rights are civil and political rights that are both enforceable by law and
emphasized in practice. By contrast, “soft” rights are economic, cultural, and social
rights that are neither emphasized nor enforced by law—particularly in transitional
states. See, e.g., Savitri Goonesekere, A Rights-Based Approach to Realizing Gender
Equity, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/savitri.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2010) (“It is sometimes argued that there is a hierarchy of rights according to which
some rights (civil and political) are more important than others, guaranteed and immediately realizable. According to the same argument, other rights (socio-economic
and cultural rights) are not immediately realizable . . . .”).
89
See S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 86, para. 8(c) (calling on actors to adopt
“[m]easures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and
girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and
the judiciary”). In 2003, the Secretary-General also highlighted the important role of
national election commissions in promoting women’s political participation in postconflict countries, including “the need to ensure that peace agreements contain provisions for the conduct of elections” and the establishment of “an independent and neutral national electoral commission that includes an equal number of women and men
and whose membership and mandate is the result of consultations with civil society
groups, including women’s organizations.” See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women’s Equal Participation in Conflict Prevention, Management and Conflict Resolution and in Post-Conflict Peace-Building, para. 42, delivered to the Commission on the
Status of Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2004/10 (Dec. 22, 2003).
90
See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74.
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B. Postconflict Reconstruction Is Too Reactive
In the aftermath of war, the individuals who define the programs
and initiatives of the reconstruction tend to be the same individuals
who were originally tasked with keeping the peace and securing the
cessation of hostilities. As a result, too many of these early postconflict
programs and initiatives risk being devised by military personnel and
diplomats accustomed to operating in emergency mode. A primary
tenet of military service is obeying command directives and mandates
to secure the peace. Military personnel are simply trained to achieve
very different objectives than reconstruction requires. Reconstruction
focuses on securing sustainable rights and equality and requires a different set of professional skills for successful implementation. It is also of note that the vast majority of people on the ground and at the
organizational headquarters of the various international institutions
responsible for securing the peace are male.
Few of the people on the ground at the end of a war are the right
people to be making decisions about long-term political and econom91
ic reform. However, because military actors are almost inevitably on
the scene at the end of the war, they often become involved in decisionmaking processes to resolve postconflict issues, even those that fall
far outside of the scope and capacity of military expertise. For example, one such military actor in Bosnia noted that
[w]e understood that, by necessity, the brigade would become involved
in setting the conditions necessary for achievement of the civil aspects of
the treaty as well as those military. The leadership did not view this as
mission creep but understood that civil-military cooperation was an es92
sential, implied task of the mission.

They act as if recognizing a need, whether it be for economic or rule-of93
law reform, automatically implies their suitability to respond to it.
These military personnel also tend to take one idea, like winning the
locals over by offering protection at Arizona Market, as carte blanche

91

One retired U.S. Army Colonel expressed the view that it was “essential for our
military force to assume critical civil tasks” in Bosnia because “the civil support elements were slow to deploy.” Fontenot, supra note 15, at 199.
92
Id.
93
See id. (“Successful execution of the military tasks set the conditions for peace by
removing the immediate threat of actual combat, but only by achieving routine compliance, restoring the economy, and starting down the road to reconciliation could
lasting peace be achieved.”).

2010]

Lessons from Bosnia’s Arizona Market

1803

to go forward with other recommendations about that activity, such as
94
championing the market as a way to eradicate ethnic hostility.
Many of those who engage in postconflict work arrive in the field
well before the cessation of hostilities. Many more arrive shortly after
the formal cessation of hostilities. In this environment, when the
95
theater is not yet secure, those preparing short- and long-term postconflict strategies and programs tend to operate as if they are in
emergency response mode. As time passes, however, operating in
emergency mode becomes self-perpetuating, as if internationals are
96
identifying conflict in order to respond to it.
Responding in a reactive manner appropriate to an emergency has
negative consequences for many aspects of postconflict reconstruction
and is particularly detrimental for women. First, male military and protective figures tend, in this emergency mindset, to see women as hapless
victims who need to be rescued, or occasionally, as was the case in Bosnia, to be further victimized. Second, when the internationals believe
they are dealing with emergencies, requiring urgent emergency responses, they are not usually inclined to consider “mere” women’s issues
97
to be immediate priorities. One of the consequences of working in
the postconflict theater, employing military jargon on a daily basis and
reflexively reacting rather than planning, is that the IC may remain in
emergency mode for years after the conflict. Even when things settle—
when there is less reason to treat everything as an emergency and every
incentive to be thoughtful in creating long-term strategies, programs,
98
and plans—the IC continues to operate in reactive mode. The postconflict personnel on the ground are often not best suited for manag-

94

See, e.g., id.
For example, well into 1999, the main road between Banja Luka (capital of the
Serb entity) and Sarajevo (capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina) crossed the Inter-Entity
Boundary Line, which marked a line of confrontation. It was unrepaired, mined in
many places, and those of us who used the road assumed a certain amount of risk in
doing so. People with license plates from one entity did not travel to the other for fear
of physical harm. Land mines were common, and war criminals indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were still at large. All of these factors lent
a certain amount of tension to the postconflict work, which resulted in living and working on edge. A certain amount of that defensive behavior inevitably affected the preparation of our programs in the area.
96
See also Haynes, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that agencies in postconflict situations continually expand their mandates in order to ensure that sufficient work continues to exist for them in the developing nation).
97
See Rees, supra note 12, at 58 (“[T]he circumstances did not appear to offer the
latitude to think about ‘mere’ sex equality . . . .”).
98
See Haynes, supra note 4, at 26-27.
95
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ing economic or social policy, nor for making long-term decisions
about sustainable rule-of-law or human rights institutions. This normally does not prevent them from doing so, but it should. Sadly, in this
mode, women’s issues consistently lose out as a priority.
C. The Donor-Driven Reconstruction Process
Those who provide the funds set the tone for postconflict recon99
struction. When it comes to economic engineering, this is especially
true. Nation-states have multiple potential incentives for funding
programs in postconflict Bosnia: (1) improving conditions within
Bosnia to prevent further refugee flows across their own borders; (2)
creating safe and stable neighbors with less likelihood of future war;
(3) rendering markets and resources within the transitioning country
available for interstate business transactions or purchases by companies within their own countries; and (4) creating a country that speaks
the same political and economic language, so that negotiations can
take place on terms with which the donor state is familiar and in
which the donor state has confidence.
Since donors have particular interests in the way the reconstructed state will look and act, they often place restrictions on the
purposes for which their monies may be used. These restrictions are
often criticized for being earmarked for “sexy” issues rather than
100
those that are sorely needed but not as chic or “of the moment.” As
discussed above, women’s issues have, unfortunately, not yet attained
101
this trendy status in reconstruction. Unless this changes and gender
issues become “of the moment,” it is exceedingly unlikely that they
99

See id. at 21 (“[D]onor countries and entities . . . considered their own political
or economic motivations for a particular funding emphasis . . . .”).
100
What is “sexy” or “of the moment” is usually time and place specific. For instance, between 1999 and 2001, many people working on property repossession and
(refugee and displaced-person) return urged donors to fund programs such as improving laws and policies to encourage nondiscrimination. Observing that encouraging
displaced persons and refugees to return to their prewar communities was an IC priority, we understood that refugees were reluctant to return until they knew that they
would not face danger and discrimination and that they would be able to find work,
send their children to school, and go about their daily lives without fear. Nevertheless,
most donors insisted on spending their money constructing houses. The donors felt
that building houses was concrete, quantifiable, and identifiable. The result was that
much money was spent on houses that remained empty because displaced persons did
not feel comfortable returning. In this example, constructing houses was deemed
“sexy” and “of the moment” by donors.
101
See supra Section II.B (discussing the failure of gender mainstreaming to catch
on in the postconflict reconstruction arena).
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will garner the attention of the donor states whose monies and interests drive the postconflict reconstruction process.
III. THE DEMOCRATIZATION/NEOLIBERALISM/GENDER TRIFECTA
Arguably, the entire postwar State of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
construct of the IC and its liberal economic order. The Preamble to
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed to the General
Framework Agreement for Peace, sets forth the democratic principles
believed to be necessary for reconstructing the country and securing
102
These include engaging in “democratisustainable peace within it.
103
zation” and the “promotion of a market economy.”
Placing a market economy’s promotion in a central, foundational position was neither an afterthought nor merely one piece in an overarching plan for
reconstruction. It was one of the fundamental goals of the process.
A. Democratization in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda
Democratization has become the transitional governance norm in
104
postconflict reconstruction and international interventions.
For
better or worse, every postconflict reconstruction administration since
105
the end of the Cold War has made democratization a priority.
While honed during the so-called third-wave transition, when a multitude of countries were transitioning politically from fascism or social106
ism, all postconflict reconstruction operations now contain a strong
democratization component. This is evidenced by the fact that the
term “democratization” has become virtually synonymous with the es-

102

CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl.; see also Framework, supra
note 5, Annex 4.
103
CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl.
104
See Georgina Waylen, Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics, 46 WORLD POL. 327, 330 (1994) (addressing the postconflict
focus on democracy and the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic
governance); see also ANU PILLAY, GENDER, PEACE AND PEACEKEEPING: LESSONS FROM
SOUTHERN AFRICA 4 (Inst. for Sec. Studies, Paper 128, 2006) (calling democratization
one of the “four main inter-related components” of peacebuilding, along with demilitarization, social reconstruction, and development).
105
See Jean d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations as Democracy-Building Instruments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2008) (“[T]he establishment of democratic institutions
has been systematically included in the mandate of all post-conflict administrations
since the end of the Cold War.”); see also Waylen, supra note 104, at 330 (calling democratization “unashamedly normative”).
106
See Waylen, supra note 104, at 330.

1806

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1779

tablishment or reestablishment of functioning and stable political107
governance mechanisms and infrastructure.
The IC in Bosnia prioritized the establishment of democracy in
the postwar nation. Many scholars have subsequently critiqued this
prioritization. One such critique argues for the organic growth of
democracies, questioning the very notion of international administra108
tion and, specifically, the unwillingness of the IC to relinquish control. The critique holds that even if the incipient democracy brims
with the mistakes of uneducated, corrupt, nationalistic, or self109
interested officials, such officials are nevertheless elected officials.
Another position critiques the IC idealization of elections as a vehicle
for instant democracy, arguing that elections can give the stamp of
democratic legitimacy to the very people responsible for the war by
110
entrenching them in power, thus exacerbating conflict. A third cri107

See d’Aspremont, supra note 105, at 5 (“[D]emocracy has become a fundamental criterion for the legitimatization of governments in the sense that, nowadays, a new
government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a state if it has not been
democratically elected.”).
108
Some postconflict reconstruction scenarios—Bosnia, the District of Brcko within Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan—have the additional element of international administration, whereby the IC, with the sanction and legal endorsement
of the United Nations, becomes a partial or total governance body during part of the
postconflict political-transition process. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA art. IX (obliging parties to “cooperate fully” with any future Annexes to the
Dayton Framework authorized by the U.N. Security Council); S.C. Res. 1483, para. 9,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (supporting the Iraqi people in forming an
international administration run by Iraqis); S.C. Res. 1383, at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001) (endorsing the establishment of provisional “arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions”); S.C. Res. 1264, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999) (authorizing
international forces to restore peace in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1244 ( June 10, 1999) (placing Kosovo under U.N. administration to ensure development of democratic institutions); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, para. 26, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. S/1999/1024 (Oct. 4, 1999) (proposing a transitional U.N. administration for
East Timor); see also Haynes, supra note 4, at 21-25 (providing detailed descriptions of
the nature of international administration in war-torn nations).
109
See CHANDLER, supra note 59, at 199 (arguing that true democracy may come
from the inside without international intervention); see also Haynes, supra note 4, at 13
(critiquing the incidence of “governance by fiat”); Sebastian van de Vliet, Addressing
Corruption and Organized Crime in the Context of Re-establishing the Rule of Law (discussing
the High Representative’s practice of removing democratically elected officials from
office for failing to carry out Dayton Framework principles and objectives), in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 205, 212-14.
110
See Nancy Bermeo, What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About
Postwar Democratization, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 159, 172 (2003) (discussing how the
process of democratization must overcome the “challenge of reforming or neutralizing
the problematic parties that already exist”). In the case of Bosnia, however, one would
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tique cautions that the process of rendering or requiring democracy
can be rightly perceived as deeply paternalistic, which should give
pause to those hoping to avoid charges that international administra111
tion is a new Colonialism. A final critique, most important for women, is that the IC’s emphasis on superficial procedural identifiers of
democracy often comes at the expense of substantive democratic
112
Under this critique, democratization alone
rights such as equality.
fails to achieve gender equity and likely even fails to achieve sustaina113
ble peace. Where people are insecure and do not have equal rights
and opportunities, strife is likely.
A more cynical critic might also note that democracy’s intimate
links with capitalism pose a further problem, particularly when the society in question is transitioning both politically and economically, as
was the case in Bosnia. Donor states, and the multinational corporations within them, prefer a certain amount of political stability before
they invest in rebuilding efforts. But when democratization and market
liberalization are so closely intertwined, democracy is susceptible to being seen as nothing more than a thinly disguised mechanism for establishing a capitalist free market as quickly as possible. This linkage has
also the tainted feel of a sociopolitical engineering project designed to
create a safe new nation-state. Only here, safety is synonymous with
sharing political and economic principles with the donor states. A safe
state is thus one open to investment and exploitation through donor
states’ preferred economic and political mechanisms.
have to acknowledge that the nationalists in question had already been legitimized:
first by popular support during the war and second by their inclusion in the Dayton
negotiations. See Haynes, supra note 4, at 14-20.
111
See Mats Berdal & Richard Caplan, The Politics of International Administration,
10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (2004) (“When does ‘benign’ administration become
neocolonialism and how is it to be avoided?”); Matteo Tondini, From Neo-Colonialism
to a “Light-Footprint Approach”: Restoring Justice Systems, 15 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 237,
238 (2008) (“Whatever the role of international agencies in reforming the legal systems of post-conflict countries, it has inevitably implied a form of cultural influence
and/or imposition.”).
112
For instance, observers of the reconstruction process in Bosnia now widely believe
that holding elections in 1996 was a mistake. The “elections legitimized the nationalists
who rose to power in the wake of purged ethnicities,” and the elections themselves were
rife with fraud. See Haynes, supra note 4, at 14; see also Waylen, supra note 104, at 332
(noting that classical democracy scholars concentrated narrowly on “democracy as simply
an institutional arrangement [such that] wider definitions of democracy couched in
terms of the real distribution of power in society are considered illegitimate”).
113
See, e.g., Waylen, supra note 104, at 327, 335 (remarking that “a narrow focus on
democratization is insufficient for understanding its interaction with gender relations, as
institutional democratization does not necessarily entail any wider changes,” and noting
that, until recently, the democratization literature made little mention of gender).
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B. Neoliberalism in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda
The emergence of a number of new—and newly independent—
114
states in the last half century, many of which were ripe for both political and economic transition, has led the IC to conflate postconflict
reconstruction and development with economic liberalization. Neoliberalism has been critiqued heavily in the South and East, often in the
context of postcolonial scholarship. Neoliberalism’s opponents describe it as “[t]he policies of privatization, austerity, and trade liberalization accepted willingly or unwillingly by the governments of dependent countries as a condition of approval of investment, loans, and
debt relief by the International Monetary Fund and the World
115
Bank.” Those more favorably inclined describe it as “[a] view of the
world that favors social justice while also emphasizing economic
116
growth, efficiency, and the benefits of free markets.”
During the post–Cold War period of economic and political transition, it became standard practice for Western countries and Westerndominated institutions to urge the market liberalization of socialist
117
states.
This practice had harsh gender consequences throughout
the former Soviet Union. After all, one of the primary components of
118
the great communist experiment had been gender equity. Women’s
participation in the labor markets in former Soviet states, in particular
within industrial and technical fields, had risen to levels surpassing the
119
120
In the FRY, as the communist regime collapsed and the
West.
114

These states include Bosnia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
Republic of the Congo, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
115
BENJAMIN KEEN & KEITH HAYNES, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, at xiii (8th ed.
2009); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., The End of Neo-Liberalism?, NEW EUROPE, July
20-26, 2008, at 3 (“The world has not been kind to neoliberalism, that grab-bag of
ideas based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently, and serve the public interest well. It was this market fundamentalism that underlay Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ in favor of privatization, liberalization, and independent central banks focusing
single-mindedly on inflation.”).
116
ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 188 (2006).
117
See Sean Gervasi, Germany, U.S., and the Yugoslav Crisis, COVERTACTION, Winter
1992–1993, at 41, 42.
118
See R.W. CONNELL, GENDER 23 (2002) (“One of the great experiments in gender equality was undertaken by the Soviet Union.”).
119
See id. (“Women’s participation in industry and other forms of technical employment rose to levels never matched in the capitalist ‘West.’”).
120
Before the war and its dissolution, FRY consisted of present-day Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.
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West began pushing liberal market policies, women disappeared from
the political scene. As the IMF and World Bank pressured FRY to privatize state-owned companies and reduce the workforce, women dis121
appeared from the workforce as well.
Some scholars, however, argue that the gains made by women under communism were only superficial. For example, while women
held more seats in parliament in the USSR than ever before in history,
more even than women in other western legislative bodies, the USSR
122
parliament had no power.
The fact that such gains were hollow
lends credence to the critique that a focus on political and procedural
rights often comes at the expense of considering substantive econom123
ic and social rights. In the postconflict reconstruction context, this
provides a strong empirical argument for going beyond mere inclusion of women in the political process. The USSR example shows that
male patriarchies could pretend to make women equal by placing
them in political institutions while withholding real power and substantive gains. That this occurred in a communist system rather than
in a democratic system tends only to support the feminist argument
that it is the state itself—not the particular political or economic phi124
losophy employed by the state—that is patriarchal. Both communist
states and capitalist democratic states have equal potential for limiting
women’s gains.
Bosnia is unique among former socialist states in that it also suffered a war. It is unique among postconflict states in that it also suffered a transitioning economy. While many ex-Soviet and Eastern European economies that experienced difficulty transitioning from
communism and socialism to more liberal political and economic sys-

121

Cf. Haynes, supra note 30, at 226 n.17 (citing statistics showing that about seventy percent of the unemployed in Russia were women).
122
See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 25 (“Women won a higher proportion of seats
in Soviet parliaments than in almost any other part of the world—but the Soviet parliaments had no power.”); see also Tatjana Djuric Kuzmanovic, Introduction to Feminist
Economics: Household, Market and State, J. FOR POL. THEORY & RES. ON GLOBALIZATION,
DEV. & GENDER ISSUES, http://www.globalizacija.com/doc_en/e0017ram.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2010) (arguing that in Serbia, although women were supposed to be
equal partners under the prewar socialist economy, “[i]n reality, patriarchal gender
regimes dominated women’s lives inside the household, and gender inequalities remained present both in the private and public spheres . . . . Women were more commonly employed in poorly paid industries . . . [and] received 15% lower salaries.”).
123
See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 104 (“Theories of the state tend to forget that
the state is only one of society’s centres of power.”).
124
See id. at 103-04 (describing the “obvious” reasons why feminists have viewed
the state as a patriarchal institution).
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tems can provide useful points of comparison to Bosnia, these transitional difficulties were hugely exacerbated in Bosnia by the war. Its
nascent, transitioning economy was destroyed. Even before Bosnia
became a state or the war began, the IC—in the guise of the IMF—was
125
pressuring FRY to begin liberalizing its markets. After the war, market liberalization became a primary tenet of the reconstruction—
126
embedded in the very Constitution of the new country. The market
liberalization that was underway became conflated with the postconflict reconstruction process.
C. Gender in the Postconflict Reconstruction Agenda
1. Failure to Consider Gender Issues in Bosnia
Women were certainly highlighted as unique victims of the war in
127
Bosnia, but they were not included at the peace negotiations, and
their particular needs and interests were not considered in any part of
128
Women were ignored by the international
the Dayton Framework.
entities purporting to reconstruct the country, despite the frequent
invocation of the heinous crimes committed against women as a basis
129
and legal justification for international intervention during the war.
125

See Gervasi, supra note 117, at 43. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 91-117
(discussing the role of the IC in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
126
See CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl. The Constitution and
another Annex to the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace hand control
of much of Bosnian economic policy to Bretton Woods institutions and the Londonbased European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Id.; Framework,
supra note 5, Annex 9. Article VII of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that the first governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be
appointed by the IMF. CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA art. VII, § 2. The
EBRD appoints the chairman of the Bosnian Commission on Public Corporations,
which supervises operations of all public sector enterprises and restructuring, including the sell-off of State and socially owned assets and the procurement of long-term
investment funds. Framework, supra note 5, Annex 9, art. I.
127
The horrific practice of systematically raping women in Bosnia gave rise to a
new understanding of rape as a war crime under international law. See generally MASS
RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed.,
Marion Faber trans., 1994) (collecting essays on the systematic rape of women in postconflict Bosnia that argue for recognition of mass rape as a war crime).
128
See Rees, supra note 12, at 55-58 (arguing that it was shocking that so many international players and institutions failed to include a gender dimension when setting
forth the rules by which an entire country would be reconstructed and that this omission was particularly egregious given the gendered dimension of some of the most
heinous crimes committed during this war).
129
See, e.g., General Assembly, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Annual Report to the Secretary-General, paras. 732-757, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12,
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The IC established a mission to reconstruct and democratize
130
Bosnia. The mission, however, was strong on procedural democracy (free and fair elections) and weak on substantive democracy
(equality and fairness), particularly during the first five years after
cessation of hostilities. Due to the strong emphasis on procedural
democracy and the heavy criticism of the IC for having organized
elections too early, the IC left itself open to charges that its “demo131
The link becratization” was really just a cover for “capitalism.”
tween democracy and human rights only emerged later, when the IC
got around to creating and strengthening human rights institutions
(e.g., the Human Rights Chamber and the Ombudsmen) and the
rule of law (e.g., the Constitutional Court and the vetting of judges
appointed under the old regimes). By then, however, so much had
been made of liberalizing Bosnia’s market, and so little of the substantive inequities in that market, that there was almost no place for
discussion of social and economic rights.
The same pattern occurred with regard to human rights. It was
the “hard” procedural rights most familiar to western neoliberal states
(political and civil rights embodied in election laws and criminal
codes) that took precedence, while the “soft” rights (social, cultural,
132
and economic) received little or no attention.
The IC is best at the procedural and visible aspects of gender
133
mainstreaming, for example, putting women into elected office.
1994) (discussing the atrocities perpetrated against women and the need to help these
women on an international level).
But see Yugoslavia:
Whose Bloody War?,
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt//ws93/yugoslavia.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (arguing that although women needed assistance, they could not hope to get it from foreign
militaries, which have their own histories of rape and sexual exploitation).
130
See Haynes, supra note 4, at 7-12 (discussing the IC’s goals and efforts in reconstruction).
131
Cf. Elizabeth H. Crighton, Beyond Neoliberalism: Peacemaking in Northern Ireland,
25 SOC. JUST. 75, 75 (1998) (noting that, in contrast with many other places, Northern
Ireland avoided neoliberal social and economic engineering); Paul Williams & Ian
Taylor, Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the ‘New’ South Africa, 5 NEW POL. ECON.
21, 26 (2000) (remarking that, with respect to having market liberalization foisted
upon South Africa, “representatives of big business continued their educational
‘charm offensive’ on the ANC elite,” saving the country from suffering Bosnia’s fate).
132
Ironically, the American Supervisors of Brcko were slightly more attentive than
the rest of the IC in Bosnia to soft rights and substantive democracy. See, e.g., Jeffrey,
supra note 27, at 216 (discussing the Supervisor’s priority of imposing “multi-ethnic
schooling” in Brcko despite deep local opposition).
133
See Martha Walsh, Aftermath: The Impact of Conflict on Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 (Ctr. for Dev. Info. & Evaluation, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Working Paper
No. 302, 2000), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACJ322.pdf (“After the
first postconflict elections in 1996, there was a massive retrenchment of women from
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Unsurprisingly, many have argued—as was argued above with regard
to the USSR—that the federal politicians in both Bosnia and Kosovo
134
have little, if any, real power. If those electoral bodies have no real
political authority, then women’s participation in those institutions is
largely meaningless.
Some gender scholars argue that women can actually exercise
more power from within NGOs and other “alternative” institutions or
in economic, cultural, and social, rather than political, spheres of
135
power.
In Bosnia, women were virtually invisible in the initial Dayton-based negotiations regarding political and governance structures,
but they dominated civil society, both with respect to their representation in numbers and the fact that women created and ran many of the
136
Potentially motivating instituNGOs that sprang up after the war.
tional emphasis on women’s political or civil involvement in Bosnia is
the ever-present desire for accession to the Council of Europe and ul-

public life. In the BiH House of Representatives (which represents both entities), only
one woman was elected to the 42-seat chamber (2.38 percent). In the Federation,
women were elected to 7 seats out of 140 (5 percent), while in the RS Parliament only
2 out of 106 seats (1.89 percent) were won by women.”).
134
See, e.g., id. (“As part of the socialist egalitarian system, there was a quota for
women’s representation in government. In 1986, women constituted 24.1 percent of
the Assembly of the Republic of BiH and 17.3 percent of representatives of municipal
assemblies. However, a number of Bosnian women commented that women elected to
office under this system were politically connected and the relatively high rates of
women’s participation did not reflect commitment to visibility of women in politics.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Waters, supra note 35 (arguing that in postconflict Bosnia, the entities (RS and Federation) hold the real power while the IC-created
federal government holds little).
135
See, e.g., Kathleen O’Reilly, Women Fieldworkers and the Politics of Participation, 31 SIGNS
1075, 1094-95 (2006) (discussing changes that women working for NGOs cause to be implemented); Cockburn, supra note 40, at 8 (“[L]ocal women’s NGOs must be consulted,
befriended, made partners with the international community and have equal rights in the
process.”); Andrea Cornwall, Pathways of Women’s Empowerment, 50.50, July 30, 2007,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/pathways_of_womens_empowerment (explaining
that the means to empower women have changed in recent times to a focus on personal
power, agency, and making choices). This is also consistent with my experience interacting
with postwar Bosnian NGOs. In Bosnia, NGOs and even the Bosnian government were far
more adept at recognizing the importance of gender in postwar reconstruction than the IC
was. See Rees, supra note 12, at 51; see also CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (arguing that women may make more gains within and through civil society rather than within
formal electoral power structures).
136
See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74. Alternatively, some argue that
women organize through civil society and seek to reclaim the home as a space, in order to recover from the trauma of war. They do so precisely because it is outside of the
political and public spheres. See Walsh, supra note 133, at 4 (“[W]omen in the immediate aftermath of the conflict sought . . . the life they led before the war.”).
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137

timately entry into the European Union.
This underlying motivation gives rise to a real question whether women’s involvement is
meant to bring women onto the playing field as equal power holders
or merely to allow Bosnia to check off a “gender mainstreaming” box
138
toward accession.
Gender scholars in the Balkans also question the inconsistent attention of the western interveners who sometimes treat women in Bosnia
as “‘a blind spot’ . . . prevalent [only for their] non-presence, ‘footnote’
presence or ‘case study’ presence,” and other times as “everyone’s case
139
study” and the “face/body of (post)war trauma” in Bosnia. Women,
along with their pain and suffering, are used not only by internationals
but also by their own nationalist brethren. The Bosnian woman has
gone “[f]rom being the idealised working woman of socialist rhetoric
140
[to] . . . the equally idealised ‘mother of the nation.’”
When rare efforts are made to include women in postconflict development concepts, the women in question are often essentialized—
reduced to their victimhood—with postconflict redress limited to po141
tential criminal prosecution of their brutalizers. Despite primarily political efforts at gender mainstreaming, activities like human trafficking
take place in Bosnia because women in Bosnia (not just Bosnian women) are not spoken to, consulted, or truly seen. Bosnian women who
feel, as stated above, that they represent the “face/body” of postwar
trauma, when coupled with newfound postprivatization unemployment,
might reasonably feel that they are pawns in a neoliberal enterprise.
Bosnian women are struggling to find their own voices. In so
doing, they have had to peel off layer upon layer of narratives foisted
upon them by the IC, many of which fail to take them into account or
exist only to satisfy the required gender-mainstreaming components
of the various reconstruction programs. Gender is important to consider in the reconstruction of a country because “[a] gender perspec137

See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74.
See infra Part IV; cf. CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (pointing out
that with respect to women’s equality, “de facto change is not [a] simple consequence
of de jure change”).
139
Dr. Jasmina Husanovic, Associate Professor in Cultural Studies, Univ. of Tuzla,
Remarks at Gender, Empire, and the Politics of Central and Eastern Europe: A Gender Symposium (May 17-18, 2007).
140
Wendy Bracewell, ‘Mothers of the Nation,’ WAR REP., Sept. 1995, at 27, 27.
141
See CAHN, HAYNES & NI AOLAIN, supra note 74 (discussing the limited response
of most postconflict processes, which reduce women to victims who are only useful in
the prosecution of their abusers when the abuse is deemed to rise to the level of war
crimes or crimes against humanity).
138
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tive makes the differences in power between women and men from
different communities visible. This requires highlighting the experiences of women because, relative to men’s experiences, they have
142
been largely invisible.”
Women in the Balkans can lead the way in thinking about the impacts of economic policy on women because of their unique vantage
point in experiencing simultaneous economic and political transition,
war, and reconstruction. As postcolonial feminists argue, for Bosnian
women to move forward, they must resist the neoliberal agenda. They
must, in the words of one postcolonial feminist, “[create an] anticapitalist transnational feminist practice—and on the possibilities, indeed
on the necessities, of cross-national feminist solidarity and organizing
143
against capitalism.”
One line of scholarly inquiry links the subservient nature of the
postwar state of Bosnia with its fledgling yet complicated federal sovereign structures and its internationally supported economy. Indeed,
some have referred to the country of Bosnia as a “courtesan state,”
prostituting itself and sublimating the will of its people in order to se144
cure essential international economic assistance. Bosnia is thus enslaved to the West by its need for money and global acceptance—
mirroring the enslaved condition of some of its women. The problem
of the “courtesan state” is not limited to Bosnia but is shared by all the
countries of the former Yugoslavia that were involved in the war and
145
that lack direct access to European and world markets.
142

SUZANNA DENNIS & ELAINE ZUCKERMAN, GENDER GUIDE TO WORLD BANK AND
IMF POLICY-BASED LENDING 2 (2006), available at http://www.genderaction.org/images/
GA%20Gender%20Guide%20to%20World%20Bank%20and%20IMF%20FINAL.pdf.
143
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes” Revisited: Feminist Solidarity
Through Anticapitalist Struggles, 28 SIGNS 499, 509 (2002); see also Ambreena Manji, ‘The
Beautyful Ones’ of Law and Development (critiquing market-oriented development models
and suggesting that the continuity of the global capitalist order be scrutinized), in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 59, 169-71 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005).
144
See, e.g., James H. Mittelman & Robert Johnston, The Globalization of Organized
Crime, the Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 103,
117 (1999) (explaining the problems inherent in the courtesan state “in which the
state does not provide social protection for its young women and men . . . but rather
tacitly forsakes safeguarding the local culture in favor of global market forces”). In
particular, Bosnia offers services to wealthy foreign interests while ignoring the need
for social services for its own lower class. In place of the state, organized crime steps in
to bridge this gap. Id. at 117-18.
145
Examples of other courtesan states include Serbia and Montenegro. For instance, Global Balkans, a research network, in discussing the scope of reconstruction
issues, states, “The post-intervention period . . . is known as the ‘tranzicija’ or ‘transi-
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There are also broader critiques of economic liberalization. One
is that internationals use the label “economic empowerment” to suggest that their goal is to assist the country in gaining economic power.
In reality, the aim is to help the country so that it can engage in the
world market to the benefit of those very internationals. The “economic empowerment” model thus serves as a means of legitimating
western hegemonic notions of a market economy without having to
confront the underlying conditions of social inequality that cause po146
Indeed, though this model might advocate increased emverty.
ployment for women, such a simplistic emphasis could backfire, resulting in cheap labor, exploitation, or even more human trafficking.
Among the local populations, not everyone finds the new eco147
nomic order beneficial to them or their country. Women who have
lived through economic transitions and have experienced assistance
(or interference) from the IC have been thinking about the gendered
148
aspects of economics for some time, and the IC would do well to listen and incorporate some of those thoughts into their postconflict reconstruction programs.
2. Lessons from Development Theory
That the IC would sponsor a market for men engaged in black
market activities and assume that it would engender interethnic harmony calls to mind “appropriate technology” stories from the international-development world. Many such technology stories, like this
tion’ in Serbia. What we are witnessing now is an accelerated privatization program,
mass unemployment, massive impoverishment following upon ten years of war, the
highest number of refugees and internally displaced people in Europe.” Interview by
Global Balkans with Tariq Ali (Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with Tariq Ali],
transcript available at http://www.counterpunch.org/gb02262008.html.
146
See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, Gender and Human Rights: Between Morals and
Politics (discussing the World Bank’s economic policy toward women and arguing
that it is “unrelated to themes of justice and equality”), in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 409, 426 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L.
Grossman eds., 2009).
147
See, e.g., Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145 (“I don’t think that transition to a
neoliberal state run on neoliberal lines with the market determining everything can help
the citizens of that state, whatever it is. So it is going to be and it is being—as we know—a
messy and one-sided transition which will not benefit the bulk of the population.”).
148
See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Can Feminist Thought Make Economics More Objective?, 1
FEMINIST ECON. 7, 20-23 (1995) (explaining that gender is expressed in the economy
and society in three ways: (1) through economic structures such as segregated markets, wage discrimination, and division of labor; (2) through symbolic differences such
as masculine and feminine job characteristics and paid versus unpaid work; and (3)
through identity expressed in preferences, beliefs, and metaphors).
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one, have a gender angle. In 1990, a development organization
passed through a town in Chad, spoke with the local leaders, and ultimately presented every household with a new, efficient woodburning stove. The goal was to reduce the amount of wood burned,
as people (women and girls) were walking farther each day to find
firewood with which to cook. The stoves were lovely. They sat low to
the ground and had three openings so that logs could be inserted
from three sides and pushed in as they burned inside the stove. The
stoves were so efficient that three logs would last for days. The development organization in question spent $1 million on the project.
Over the year following their distribution, however, the stoves were
used instead as stools to sit on when guests came to visit at friends’
houses. When the development agency returned a year later to evaluate the success of the project, they discovered the stoves being used
as stools. At this point, and only at this point, did they consult the
women of the town, asking them why they were not using the stoves
for cooking. The women informed them that they always kept fires
burning inside their houses to keep the bugs and snakes out. Had the
organization ever asked a woman whether she would use a stove
created for outdoor use, they would have learned that their project
was worthless. But they never asked.
This example illustrates many things about culture, gender, and the
149
It also parallels the Arizona
dynamics of giving and receiving aid.
Market experience, in that internationals did not ask what their support
150
for Arizona Market would be used to achieve. Ensuring that the neo149

It also illustrates the concept of metis, the notion that the best instincts about a
place—the best understanding and knowledge—will be held by the locals, who should
be consulted before investments of time and money are made. See SCOTT, supra note
61, at 319 (“[A]ny formula that excludes or suppresses the experience, knowledge, and
adaptability of metis risks incoherence and failure; learning to speak coherent sentences involves far more than merely learning the rules of grammar.” (italics added)).
Development theory has, therefore, become much more “ground up” and less “top
down” in recent decades. But another level of understanding has yet to be adopted by
those in the field of postconflict reconstruction. “Only by grasping the potential
achievement and range of metis is it possible to appreciate the valuable knowledge that
high-modernist schemes deprive themselves of when they simply impose their plans,”
and capitalism kills metis. Id. at 323, 335 (italics added).
150
In fact, as to Bosnia as a whole, no one asked what work had already been done
on the topic of women in war. No one even considered women. See Rees, supra note
12, at 54 (“Gender issues never surfaced in the [General Framework] drafting
process.”). As Rees points out, a World Conference on women had been held in the
very year the General Framework Agreement was drafted. Id. at 56. At the World Conference, a Platform for Action was drawn up, which developed, in a section entitled
“Women and Armed Conflict,” plans as to what the U.N. and NGOs should do to take
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liberal dream and the myth of the free market materialized in the form
of an actual market was the beginning and end of the inquiry. Whereas
those in the development world have arguably learned from past failures to take women into consideration and have rectified the situation
151
by developing doctrine and policies to take gender into account, it is
not at all clear that those lessons have been normalized and incorporated into postconflict reconstruction discourse.
In the context of international intervention and postconflict reconstruction, the conditions imposed upon acceptance of the neoliberal agenda may have undesirable consequences. In order to receive
financial assistance or EU accession, for example, Bosnia must continue to privatize, downsize, and liberalize its economy, even if those
policies have a negative impact on social justice in the polity. Put differently, the interveners mistakenly assume that the free market is a
force majeure with the potential even to correct for social injustice. In a
country rife with ethnic conflict, the international interveners should
instead be setting social justice as the primary goal, not just assuming
that the market will correct for economic, ethnic, and social inequities. Those supporting Arizona Market appeared to operate according to the mistaken belief that the free market would correct for ethnic disharmony, creating a business space in which strife would fall
away in favor of money making. This belief presupposed the certainty
of free market economics. But economics is not science, even when
152
practiced by economists.

into account the impact of war on women. Id. at 57. Nevertheless, none of that thinking and planning was considered when developing plans for the reconstruction of
Bosnia. Id. at 57.
151
See, e.g., Elizabeth Durbin, Towards a Gendered Human Poverty Measure, 5 FEMINIST
ECON. 105, 105 (1999) (advocating alternative gender indicators for measuring the human
dimensions of development in terms of the choices and opportunities women and men
face); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dilemmas and Directions,
12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 338 (2006) (“Integrating gender in the post-conflict
process specifically includes . . . proceeding upon the recognition that sustainable development requires gender equity.”); Maria Eitel, For the First Time in History, Girls Were All over Davos, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-eitel/for-thefirst-time-in-his_b_163362.html (quoting U.S. Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), who remarked, “I’m hoping there will continue to be a focus on girls because they are really so key
to successful development and progress”).
152
See Ass’n for Women’s Rights in Dev., Ten Principles for Challenging Neoliberal Globalization, J. FOR POL. THEORY & RES. ON GLOBALISATION, DEV. & GENDER ISSUES, http://
www.globalizacija.com/doc_en/e0024neo.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“Economics is
often represented as technical and scientific, based on ‘truths’ from mathematics or statistics. However, economic policy is profoundly political and represents a certain set of
subjective assumptions about power and the distribution of resources.”).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF NEOLIBERALISM ON WOMEN
When the IC arrives to work on “traditional” postconflict reconstruction programs, it also begins to regulate—sometimes persuasively
and sometimes through direct intervention—the political and economic systems and the political and economic rights ultimately
153
adopted within these transitioning and postconflict states.
Neoliberal economic strategies include deregulating markets, reducing taxes and government services, and privatizing business and
property. These economic policies often have extremely gendered
outcomes that are almost always detrimental to women.
A. Privatization of Business
One of the first steps of economic liberalization is to privatize any
business owned or run by the government or the workers. The gendered impact of this policy is immediately evident. Resources are
154
shifted into male-dominated corporations and market mechanisms.
As businesses and factories are privatized, the neoliberal agenda requires business streamlining. Not every member of the polity can be
employed in a nonsocialist state. Some people have to be fired to
make operations more efficient and competitive in the new, free market. This was a basic prerequisite of IMF and World Bank financial assistance to Bosnia. One of the most marked human costs of economic
transition from socialism to capitalism across the former Eastern Bloc
has been the rise of gender inequity in the composition of the labor
155
force. Women are the first to be downsized or laid off.
153

See d’Aspremont, supra note 105, at 1 (arguing that democracy building is a
positive trend, as stable democratic states within the IC take an interest in reining in
the “most erratic and unpredictable manifestations” of new statehood).
154
See CONNELL, supra note 118, at 149-50 (“Men control almost all market-based
institutions, such as corporations, and acquire most of the income distributed through
markets, such as salaries and wages. Neo-liberalism, in exalting the power of markets,
has thus tended to restore the power and privilege of men.”); see also Waylen, supra
note 104, at 327 (noting that the effects of democratization on women have not been
adequately explored).
155
In Hungary, when 30% of jobs disappeared, women’s employment levels declined by nearly 24% between 1990 and 2001. In Poland, women’s employment levels
declined by nearly 8% over the same period. In Argentina, where women comprised
only 12.1% of the total workforce, women lost their jobs during economic transition at
a much higher rate than men. GEORGINA WAYLEN, ENGENDERING TRANSITIONS 181-82
(2007); cf. Haynes, supra note 30, at 226 n.17 (citing sources stating that between seventy and eighty percent of the unemployed in Russia are women). Similarly, many
jobs were reserved for former military members, all of whom were men, effectively eliminating women from being hired postconflict and postprivatization.
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Privatization changes employment patterns, and where jobs are
156
downsized, women are the first to go.
For example, in some countries where women were hugely underrepresented in the pretransition
formal labor force, women’s participation in paid privatized employ157
ment can slightly increase with market reforms. In other instances,
however, where women had been fully employed as part of the socialist policies of the pretransition state, those women lost across the
158
board as a result of privatization.
The problem is that labor itself is gendered. Not only are men in
greater positions of earning power within privatized businesses, but in
these new private markets the work done by women often goes unre159
cognized and undervalued. There are usually more men employed in
160
the formal market than women. Further, more women are employed
in public sector jobs than in private, and men dominate the private sector. When public sector jobs are eradicated pursuant to neoliberal policies dictated by internationals, women lose jobs while men gain them
as attention and funding are channeled into the private sector. Women
are typically underrepresented in the private sector, unless the particular private sector job is not particularly respected; as soon as it becomes
161
desirable, men take over. Where women do make it into the private
156

Kuzmanovic, supra note 122 (stating that Serbia’s Law on Privatization, passed
in 2001, had the simultaneous negative effect of increasing the supply of available female laborers and decreasing the demand for women laborers); see also TAMAR SABEDASHVILI, GENDER AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF GEORGIA 1991–2006, at 12
(2007) (noting that women were most likely to be made redundant or have their pay
cut during privatization in Georgia and that subsequent wages were so low that they
would not cover the transportation costs of getting to and from the job).
157
For example, in Brazil, the percentage of women in the workforce increased
from 42.5% in 1990 to 44.5% in 1997 after market reforms were instituted; in Chile,
the figure was 35.2%, up from 28%. These increases came at the expense of male employment, which decreased. WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 181.
158
Id. at 181-82; see also Haynes, supra note 30, at 221 (noting that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian women contributed significantly to the supply side
of trafficked women, due in part to the lack of employment alternatives).
159
See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 1999, at 73 (1999).
160
See, e.g., Faranak Miraftab, Neoliberalism and Casualization of Public Sector Services:
The Case of Waste Collection Services in Cape Town, South Africa, 28 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 874, 877-78 (2004) (noting that women in South Africa dominate the informal sector of domestic service).
161
See WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 181-82 (citing statistics supporting the assertion
that women in transitioning states bear higher unemployment rates); id. at 183-84 (citing the fact that women dominated the financial sectors in East Central Europe and
Russia under socialism, but when those economic systems opened up and financialservices jobs became desirable, men moved into the highest positions, surpassing
women who had held those positions); Waylen, supra note 104, at 345.
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162

sector, it is largely within the service industry.
Women in higher socioeconomic strata tend to retain or find employment, while women of
163
lower socioeconomic status do not.
B. Welfare Reforms
Welfare reforms central to market liberalization also have a highly
gendered impact. Because women tend to rely more heavily on public
services, the dismantling of socialism was particularly detrimental to
164
them. This reliance results from women’s role as caretaker in most
165
Additionally, women and children make up the bulk of
societies.
refugees and internally displaced persons, groups that depend most
166
heavily on public services.
When state spending is cut at the behest of the internationals
167
leading the governance reforms, women lose out. Most socialist (or
even social democratic) regimes subsidized childcare, maternity leave,
168
Under market reform, those programs get
and parental leave.

162

WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 183.
Id. at 184.
164
At the end of the war in Bosnia, around two-thirds of the population in that region was female. See, e.g., SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 11 (stating that women comprise fifty-five percent of all internally displaced persons). According to the Women’s
Refugee Commission, four out of five of the world’s nearly 45 million displaced people
are women, children, and young people. Women’s Refugee Comm’n, Gender, http://
www.womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/gender (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
165
WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 6-7; see also Julie Cupples, Counter-Revolutionary Women:
Gender and Reconciliation in Post-War Nicaragua, GENDER & DEV., Nov. 2004, at 8, 9 (“[T]he
new government promised to promote more traditional gender identities for women, and
called for women to return to the home to be good wives and mothers . . . .”).
166
See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS POST-CONFLICT 10 (2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/
issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf (discussing the particular vulnerability of women and refugees to violations of social and economic rights).
167
See Cupples, supra note 165, at 9 (arguing that the structural adjustment programs regularly required by the World Bank have a “distinctly gendered impact” in
that the attendant reduction of social services that accompanies a liberalizing economy
drastically increases the burdens on women, who become the caretakers for those formerly cared for in part by the government); Manji, supra note 143, at 169-71 (critiquing market-oriented development models, asking for analysis, and suggesting that
the continuity of the global capitalist order be scrutinized).
168
See, e.g., Heidi Gottfried, Report, In Defense of Socialized Child Care: A Comparison
of Child-Care Policy in the United States and Sweden, 1 NWSA J. 336, 337 (1988) (discussing
subsidies); Valerie Polakow, Who Cares for the Children?: Denmark’s Unique Childcare Model, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 604, 604 (1997) (“In Denmark . . . the government has assumed the cost of subsidizing a high-quality, comprehensive child-care system . . . .”).
163
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169

cut.
The result is that women, due to their traditional roles in the
family—and in the case of the former Soviet countries, these were
roles that were immediately resurrected after lying dormant for two to
three generations—stay home to care for children and sick family
members. Finally, under market reform, wages are often decreased as
positions become competitive, rendering it financially nonsensical for
both parents to work when additional wages would not meet the costs
170
of childcare.
C. Other Social and Labor Reforms
Under market liberalization, workers’ social security benefits are
restructured. This has a tremendously gendered outcome. As state
systems transition, social benefits accrue to the primary breadwinners,
who tend to be men, because of the increasingly unfavorable wages
for women. Women contribute less to social security because they are
paid less and tend to be employed for fewer years, as they stay home to
care for children and aging relatives. As a consequence, men’s eligi171
bility for social security typically vastly surpasses that of women.
D. Privatization of Property
One of the primary tenets of the neoliberal agenda is the privatization of formerly socially held properties. For the free market to
work, businesses and homes may no longer be owned by the state.
Privatization began in Bosnia even before the war: The government
would provide vouchers based on criteria such as age and military service. Recipients could exchange the vouchers for shares in privatized
172
companies or sell them for cash. Similarly, after the war, the former
socially owned apartments could be purchased under a complex
scheme whereby people who had been displaced in the war could ap-

169

State funding for food subsidies and prenatal-nutrition programs is also cut
under market reform, which disproportionately impacts women. WAYLEN, supra note
155, at 185-88.
170
Cf. SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 12 (stating, by way of comparison, that
women in Georgia, during a similar market-liberalization process, were most likely to
be made redundant or have their pay cut, and that subsequent wages were so low that
they would not cover the transportation costs of getting to and from the job).
171
See WAYLEN, supra note 155, at 191-92 (discussing social security restructuring).
172
See Walsh, supra note 133, at 6 (noting that the “complicated” privatization system in Bosnia uses vouchers that compensate for payments withheld during the war).
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ply to repossess their former apartments, occupy them briefly, and
173
then sell them.
After the war, both of these systems were corrupted by the continued pursuit of the wartime goal of ethnic cleansing. Croatia, for instance, refused to allow displaced minorities to repossess their socially
174
held apartments during and immediately after the war.
This effectively prevented all Croatian Serbs who had been ejected during Op175
The
eration Storm from claiming ownership of their apartments.
apartments were then declared “abandoned” by the Croatian government and given to Bosnian Croats, who had been invited by thenPresident Franjo Tudjman to leave Bosnia and populate the formerly
176
Despite the
Croatian Serb–held sections of Croatia in the Krajina.
blatant manipulation of the privatization process to carry out wartime
objectives of ethnic cleansing in Croatia, the IC barely objected. It was
as if privatization itself was the only goal. The creation of the market
economy was all that mattered, regardless of whether those market
processes were used to exclude people on the basis of race and therefore to effectively complete ethnic-cleansing objectives. In Bosnia,
too, the various entity leaders attempted to pass laws that would prevent ethnically undesirable people from reclaiming their property.
But in Bosnia these laws were overturned by the High Representative
once the members of the IC who were responsible for protecting human rights explained the undemocratic nature of the laws and in177
sisted they be overturned.
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For more on privatization laws in the Balkans, see generally Charles Philpott &
Rhodri C. Williams, The Dayton Dialectic: The Significance of Property Deprivation and Repossession in the Context of Ethnic Cleansing, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 4, ch. 6. For more on the impact of privatization generally, see, for example, SABEDASHVILI, supra note 156, at 15-16. For more on socially owned property and
corruption in the return of that property, see generally Massimo Moratti, Tackling Obstruction to Property Rights and Return: A Critical Assessment of the Practice of Removing Housing Officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 149, 150-52.
174
Cf. Bogdan Ivanisevic, Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004, at 351, 361-62 (2004).
175
Id. at 361.
176
My first UNHCR post was that of Protection Officer in Knin, Croatia, the heartland of the Krajina Serb routing. It served as a clear vantage point for viewing the impact of the laws being passed in Croatia on the entire region in terms of displacement
of persons.
177
See generally Philpott & Williams, supra note 173 (discussing the property laws
and the IC’s attempts to rewrite them).
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Another consequence of privatizing apartments was that many
178
women lost out.
Prewar, the socially owned flats had been held as
“occupancy rights,” something more than a lease but less than ownership. Occupancy rights provided a permanent or long-term right to
remain without a right to sell. Before the war, state enterprises owned
many apartments, which they gave to workers or those who had served
in the military. After the war, with a housing shortage attributed to
war damage and massive ethnic displacement, establishing an occupancy right became extremely complex and was regularly subjected to
manipulation by nationalists.
The property laws that were rewritten multiple times in Bosnia,
Croatia, and Serbia, often with negative consequences for the “undesirable” ethnic minority in that particular region, also had negative consequences for women. This was particularly true for single women. For
example, the Law on the Sale of Apartments in Bosnia allowed for a reduction in the purchase price of an apartment based on the number of
179
years the buyer had worked. It also allowed spouses to combine their
years of work to increase the deduction, but it did not allow a surviving
180
spouse to combine working years with those of a deceased spouse.
Women, both by virtue of longer life spans and the wartime death toll
181
among men, constituted the majority of surviving spouses. Young widows, with few if any working years of their own, and unemployed single
women were disproportionately disadvantaged by this system, as they
182
had few preliberalization work years to count.
Furthermore, the occupancy right went to the former soldier or
factory worker, not to the family as a whole, which again left women at
a disadvantage in acquiring their own flat on the privatizing market.
183
Women often held no legal title.
For a woman to claim a right to
property in a divorce, for instance, without her name on the title, she

178

In Bosnia and Mozambique, for instance, women had the most difficulty acquiring
and holding on to land during the privatization process. MARCIA E. GREENBERG & ELAINE
ZUCKERMAN, THE GENDER DIMENSIONS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 6-6 (2009),
available at http://www.genderaction.org/images/GenderDimensionsPCR_2009.pdf; see
also Walsh, supra note 133, at 7.
179
Law on Sale of Apartments with Occupancy Rights, Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 27/97; 11/98; 22/99; 27/99; and 7/00, art. 21
(Bosn. & Herz.).
180
Walsh, supra note 133, at 7.
181
Id.
182
See id. (“This particularly affects young widows, who have few if any working
years of their own.”).
183
Id.
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was required to prove that she contributed substantial income during
184
the marriage.
“Moreover, men can transfer title to others (other
185
family members, for example) so that women had no claim.” Given
these practices, property privatization, the lynchpin of the neoliberal
agenda in transitioning Bosnia from socialism to capitalism and communism to democracy, exacerbated gender inequality.
The total impact of economic liberalization has been devastating
for women. As one Serbian feminist economist asked, “How much
does it cost when a woman really earns as much as a man? How expensive is it not to take into consideration women’s leadership and to186
tal potential?”
V. USING HUMAN RIGHTS “BENCHMARKS” AS A VEIL TO
ACHIEVE A NEOLIBERAL MARKET
In order for Bosnia to be invited into the world community on
equal terms with other sovereign nations, it must overcome its courtesan-state status. And yet, the terms that the IC has given Bosnia for
entrance to the world community, and in particular to the European
Community, are provided in the form of a checklist toward accession
187
The list is created by the Council of Euto the European Union.
rope, a European organization concerned with human rights, and
188
therefore consists primarily of human rights concerns. Bosnia’s task
in ridding itself of pawn status while slavishly following a checklist is a
troubled one.
Notably, to check off a box on the list requires not the actualization
of the human right in question (minority rights or gender equity, for
instance), but the appearance of such protections, typically in the form
of laws requiring the protection of such rights. Bosnia must pass the
requisite laws; however, no one checks to ensure that the laws are sub184

Id.
Id. There are also arguments, beyond the scope of this Article, that war itself
disproportionately impacts women and that this was particularly true of the Balkan
conflict. The primary impact areas, in addition to human trafficking, concerned displacement, because women locate so much of their lives around “the home,” because
of the increase in domestic violence, and because of girls dropping out of school in
higher numbers than men. See Walsh, supra note 133, at 3.
186
Kuzmanovic, supra note 122.
187
See European Comm’n, Accession Criteria, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
188
See ALLEN F. TATHAM, ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 214-18 (2009)
(describing the role of the Council of Europe in formulating human rights criteria for
accession to the European Union).
185
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sequently implemented or enforced. Of course, the fact that the list
merely asks for a law, without enforcement, does not in and of itself
mean that this is a bad approach. On the contrary, the incentive to
join the European Union has probably been more of a catalyst for the
protection of the human rights of citizens and guests of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia than any other carrot or stick.
The other goal of the accession list is the economic liberalization of
the states in question. This is due in part to most sovereign states in today’s world community believing in a link between the protection of
human rights and a liberal economy, despite ample evidence that severe labor exploitation and labor discrimination are staples of many
liberal economies. The insistence on economic liberalization is also in
part because the liberal states of the world community are in the business of promoting their own companies and industries. They hope to
quickly enter the newly privatizing countries and be the first on the
ground to exploit whatever business opportunities and natural re189
Ironically, liberalized states share this behavior
sources might exist.
with notably less liberalized states, like China and Russia, which also
rush in to fill the vacuum with their industries and snatch up any natural resources that might be for sale. In this respect, the common factor
is economic self-interest, not the goal of liberalizing the economy of the
transitioning state. The people being transitioned are caught in the
190
middle. Finally, western states impose the checklist because they see a
189

For example, Western governments believed that there were oil deposits in
parts of Bosnia and made sure that those regions were under U.S. control—Amoco was
on the ground in 1996 to make assessments. Additionally, the World Bank verified
“substantial petroleum fields in the Serb-held part of Croatia.” Michel Chossudovsky,
Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonising Bosnia, 7 DEV. PRAC. 375, 382 (1997) (quoting Frank Viviano & Kenneth Howe, Bosnia Leaders Say Nation Sits atop Oil Fields, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 28, 1995, at A1). Western governments have shown greater interest in
gaining access to potential strategic natural resources than in committing resources for
rebuilding Bosnia. When the World Bank loaned money to Croatia after it seceded
from the former Yugoslavia, it “demanded a Croatian capital market structured to
heighten the penetration of Western institutional investors and brokerage firms.” Id.
at 379. “[T]he occupation of Yugoslavia suited the global strategic needs of the United
States once it saw that the Europeans had made a big mess, breaking up a country and
not being able to deal with it. Then they went to show the Europeans that ‘we are still
around and we are the power here.’” Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145.
190
See Interview with Tariq Ali, supra note 145 (“[N]eoliberal economic policies
are being implemented at a vastly accelerated pace throughout the Balkans. Most of
the population, whatever their political orientation, are caught between what in Serbia
are now called the ‘tajkuns’ (tycoons), that is the new term for these local tycoons who
have profited off of all the instability, and, on the other hand, foreign multinational
capital.”); see also Chossudovsky, supra note 189, at 379 (noting that a precondition for
the massive loans Croatia borrowed from the IMF just after it seceded from the Former
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link between politically safe neighbors, political partners, and liberalized economies. Capitalist states are safe to deal with and engage with
191
in world politics, they believe; socialist states are not.
When the IC negotiated the peace at Dayton, it ensured that its
economic interests would be protected. Feminists and antineoliberal
thinkers have identified the self-interest of the donor countries imposing the standards as a problem, arguing that women’s rights discourse,
when it was discussed at all, was being manipulated by the most zealous
192
proponents of the free market.
In fact, gender and “gender main193
streaming” are regular components of the accession checklists.
The
premise of the neoliberal doctrine is to combine the notions of social
justice and a free market economy. At its best, the goal would be to
bring about social justice—creating or fostering a free market economy
would merely be one possible tool in carrying out that mission of securing social justice. Instead, the tail is wagging the dog. The goal, as seen
by the IC in Bosnia, is the free market economy—sometimes renamed
“democratization”—intimating that, to most western donor countries,
democracy and a free market economy are synonymous.
Filtered through the thinking of the IC around the creation of
and support for Arizona Market, social justice, or “human rights,” became a nice by-product of the free market. It was believed that “if we
build this market, ethnicities might get along.” Later, some members
of the IC carried it further and began to act as if the free market had
the power to actually correct for social injustice or human rights violaYugoslavia was a series of “economic reforms” that resulted in plant closures and bankruptcies, driving wages to abysmally low levels). The unemployment rate increased
from 15.5% in 1991 to 19.1% in 1994, while Croatia dismembered its large formerly
state-owned utilities. Id.
191
See Chossudovsky, supra note 189, at 376 (“Despite Belgrade’s political nonalignment and extensive trading relations with the USA and the then European Community, the Reagan Administration had targeted the Yugoslav economy . . . ‘to promote a “quiet revolution” to overthrow Communist governments and parties’, while
reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the world market.”
(quoting Gervasi, supra note 117, at 42)). Chossudovsky further argues that the economy of Yugoslavia failed before the war because of the success of western policies. Id.;
see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FROM TRANSITION TO PARTNERSHIP: A STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK FOR USAID PROGRAMS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA 2 (1999) (“Americans
benefit as the economies of nations in transition become more open.”).
192
See, e.g., ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, SEXUAL DECOYS: GENDER, RACE AND WAR IN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 97-99 (2007) (describing neoliberal imperial feminism).
193
See Marina Blagojevic, Gender in Serbia (connecting the process of providing a
formal framework for gender inclusion and the process of accession, or “closeness,” to
the European Union), in DEVTECH SYS., INC., USAID/SERBIA & MONTENEGRO GENDER
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DRAFT GENDER ACTION PLAN 8 (2005),
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG119.pdf.
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tions. At that point, the thought was, “the liberalized economy in Arizona Market will create peace and harmony.” When accession checklists were created, full of human rights goals, it no longer mattered
whether those goals were implemented or carried out, only that the
laws were written. Now, the belief among the IC of postconflict interveners seems to be, “if you create a free market, human rights will follow.” Unsurprisingly, feminists and antineoliberal thinkers disagree.
CONCLUSION
Of the unsavory and often criminal activity taking place in Arizona Market, particularly of the sale of women for sex, one American Colonel observed, “[U]nregulated capitalism is a pretty rude
194
sort of activity.”
It is unclear whether, in so saying, he was sanctioning such activity as inevitable or critiquing it as an unsavory byproduct of a liberalizing economy. In either case, his words suggest
some of the simpler recommendations for different approaches to
postconflict reconstruction.
The first is that the longer-term postconflict sustainability projects
should be carried out by people with specific training in the area, who
are mindful of how to achieve their goals without sacrificing women’s
human rights, dignity, and physical as well as psychological integrity in
the process. This means that highly masculine military structures
must overlap and consult with persons whose agendas are not limited
to immediate physical security but rather are attuned to framing the
issues as human rights and rule-of-law concerns.
Second, the assumption that capitalism is always the right system
and that liberalizing the economies of warring countries is always the
right goal must be questioned. The present lack of postconflict reconstruction doctrine, together with the push by interested governments and their diplomatic and military representatives to prioritize
free market and military objectives, are leading to the unnecessary sacrifice of human rights and women’s rights in the aftermath of war.
Perhaps it will turn out to be true that market liberalization is key
to sustainable security. At present, however, those unskilled in making such assessments are operating on the assumption that capitalism
will correct human rights abuses. Regulation serves a purpose, offering protection against those who exploit newly developing markets. It
also serves to protect against criminal exploitation of labor, including

194
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human trafficking. Consequently, market regulation should be considered a key component of postconflict reconstruction, even if it does
not square with market liberalization.
Moreover, it is not clear that market liberalization must be a component of postconflict reconstruction. While it is clear that those international nation-states undertaking the role of contributing to the
postconflict reconstruction in Bosnia were primarily capitalist economies, this demonstrates only that those nations have an interest in engineering a new state to invite into the economic fold of free market
economies. It does not necessarily prove that an unregulated free
market economy is key to Bosnia’s development into a country where
the rights of all are respected. Given this, the regulation of developing markets must be discussed, even when creating informal neoliberal market projects and experiments.
Democratization as a priority should be similarly questioned.
Striving for democratization as a goal in and of itself can mask the
true objectives of postconflict construction, which should be to
achieve stability by fostering the components of a democratic society.
The focus should be on de facto, not just de jure, equality for women
and minorities. The IC’s fixation on democratization, with its preference for the procedural trappings of democracy, would serve women
far better by focusing instead on promoting and making central the
primary characteristic of a democracy—equality of participation.
Promoting principles of equality—equality of participation, equality of
political voice, equality of representation, and equality of consideration—would be far more beneficial to ensuring long-term and sustainable peace than development of “democratization” per se, with its
current focus on political rights, electoral systems, and institution
building. An IC truly interested in sustainable peace should focus on
including all persons, particularly those who were previously denied
or were without a true political voice, by including them in formal and
informal power structures, markets, the labor force, and educational
opportunities. It should also work on guaranteeing truly equal property and inheritance legal rights and maintaining social-welfare structures upon which women, particularly refugee and displaced women,
are dependent.
Democratization and neoliberalism on paper are not substitutes
for securing human rights any more than the creation of a free market automatically serves to achieve human rights protections. Instead,
human rights and the rule of law must be viewed as both the fundamental building blocks of postconflict reconstruction as well as the
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umbrella under which all programs and practices are conceived and
created. Placing a neoliberal agenda and democratization at the pinnacle of the reconstruction agenda inappropriately distorts the goals
of creating and maintaining a safe, secure, and sustainable peace.
More concretely, it must be acknowledged and squarely confronted that international interventions create the perfect storm for
human trafficking. The sudden influx of thousands of international
men, far away from home, with both power and money far surpassing
that of locals, can create a demand for women to be trafficked into
the country for sex. At the same time, economic-liberalization policies
create a supply of women who are un- or underemployed in the economically and politically transitioning country and are therefore uniquely susceptible to middlemen willing to exploit their desire to contribute to the family income. The conditions creating both the supply
of and the demand for trafficked women are the responsibility of the
IC, which therefore must not only work on prosecuting traffickers and
protecting victims but must also be cognizant of how its policies and
programs give rise to these conditions in order to check them before
trafficking is carried out.
The IC must acknowledge and take responsibility for the fact that
its very presence creates a demand for abusive activities like human
trafficking, while its neoliberal objectives create the supply. It must
not only acknowledge that this situation has occurred in the past, in
places like Bosnia and the Congo, but it must also anticipate that such
a confluence of circumstances will arise in the future and accordingly
seek solutions and preventative measures in the present.

